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ABSTRACT
When interest rates approach zero, conventional monetary policy may cease to be effec-
tive and central banks may adopt the use of unconventional monetary policies, such as
quantitative easing. The popularity of QE has increased particularly in the wake of the
financial crisis that began in 2007. QE and the effect it has on financial markets has been
a regularly discussed topic in financial journalism in the recent years. News articles have
often claimed that QE has an inflationary effect on stock prices but has this actually been
the case?
This thesis studies the stock market reaction to quantitative easing announcements made
by central banks. The reaction is examined for local all shares indices, and large cap and
small cap indices to find out whether the stock prices of companies with different levels
of market capitalization react differently.
A variety of parametric and nonparametric event study tests are employed to see if the
reaction is significant, positive, and do the prices of small cap stocks react differently
relative to large cap stocks. The results from the parametric and nonparametric event
study tests show that the local stock indices do indeed show a positive and significant
reaction to the announcements. Moreover, the reaction is pronounced in the case of small
cap stocks.
KEYWORDS: quantitative easing, unconventional monetary policy, event study, ab-
normal returns, market efficiency, stock index
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1. INTRODUCTION
According to Abel et al. (2014), central bank announcements and actions are closely mon-
itored by the media, participants in the financial markets, and the general public, because
monetary policy and the resulting changes in the money supply affect the economy sig-
nificantly through changes in the price level, nominal exchange rate, real GDP, real in-
terest rate, and the unemployment rate.
When interest rates approach zero conventional monetary policy may not be effective
anymore and central banks may adopt the use of unconventional monetary policies. Joyce
et al. (2012) state that the most high-profile form of unconventional monetary policy has
been Quantitative Easing (QE). In QE, a central bank purchases government securities
from the banking sector and/or the financial market with the objective that the money
received by the sellers of these securities would spill over into lending into the broader
economy which would help drive asset prices up and remove deflationary forces. The
popularity of Quantitative Easing has increased particularly in the wake of the financial
crisis that began in 2007.
The history of Quantitative Easing dates back to March 19, 2001 when the Bank of Japan
announced a new policy of "Quantitative Easing" where the BoJ increased its current
account target far beyond the level of commercial bank required reserves and raised the
ceiling on BoJ purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. This policy was in place for
nearly 5 years until it was formally lifted on March 9, 2006. (Kobayashi et al., 2006). To
this date there has been a total of 17 announcements by central banks of Japan, England,
the United States, the Euro-area and Sweden, where they have announced to the public
that they are examining the implementation of a Quantitative easing programme, will
begin a QE programme, expand the size of the asset purchases in the QE programme or
continue the QE programme longer than previously announced. A stock market reaction
of some kind can be expected from such an announcement in the announcement country
or area but has this actually been the case?
This study uses event study methodology, which statistically tests whether the announce-
ments of these quantitative easing programs lead to significant positive abnormal returns
in the short-term. The stock market reaction of small cap companies are compared with
that of large cap companies to see whether they react differently to QE announcements.
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1.2. Previous Main Studies
A number of studies have examined the effects of changes in monetary policy and eco-
nomic news announcements on stock market returns. However, comprehensive event
studies that examine the reaction of stock prices to quantitative easing announcements at
the aggregate index level are scarce.
Bernanke and Kuttner (2004) examine the reaction of the stock market on changes in
monetary policy and the economic sources of that reaction. In the event study portion of
their study, they employ simple regressions that measured the change in stock return on
the raw change in federal funds rate target, both expected and unexpected. They do not
estimate the normal (or expected return) of the stock market, but simply focus on the
change in stock return on the days when the changes in the federal funds rate target were
announced. They show a relatively strong and consistent stock market response to unex-
pected monetary policy actions. They report that an unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in
the federal funds leads to an expected one percent increase in broad stock indices. They
suggest that the effects of unexpected monetary policy actions on expected excess returns
explain the largest part of the change in stock prices.
Bredin et al. (2009) investigate the stock market response to international monetary policy
changes in the UK and Germany. They conduct an event study to examine the impact of
expected and unexpected changes in the UK and Euro/German area policy rates on the
UK and German aggregate and sectoral equity returns. They follow the event study meth-
odology adopted by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). They show that the UK monetary pol-
icy suprises have a significant negative influence on both aggregate and industry level
returns in both countries. They also point out that the Euro/German area monetary policy
surprises do not influence either Germany or UK significantly.
Thorbecke (1997) employ vector autoregression and an event study to examine how stock
return data respond to monetary policy shocks. The event study consists of an ordinary
least squares regression where the percentage change in Dow Jones Industrial Average
and Dow Jones Composite Average is regressed against the amount in percentage points
by which the federal funds rate changed. Thorbecke also employs the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory multifactor model by Ross (1976) to measure the ex-ante expected excess return
by a beta-weighted vector of risk premia. Thorbecke demonstrate that monetary policy
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has a significant effect on ex-ante and ex-post stock returns and that monetary shocks
have larger effects on small firms than large firms.
Wang and Mayes (2012) research the impact of domestic monetary policy rate announce-
ments on the stock markets in New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom and the euro
area, focusing on the unanticipated component of the announcements using event-study
methods. They follow the Bernanke and Kuttner (2004) event-study approach. Similar to
previous studies, they find that monetary policy surprises cause significant negative stock
price reactions.
There is a substantial amount of research conducted on the recent QE programs. Gagnon
et al. (2011) show that large-scale asset purchase announcements reduced U.S. long-term
yields. Joyce et al. (2011) report that Bank of England's Quantitative Easing program had
similar bond yield effects to those reported by Gagnon et al. (2011) for the U.S. program.
Hamilton and Wu (2011) use a term structure model to indirectly calculate the effects of
the Fed's 2008-2009 QE programs. Their estimates imply that at the zero lower bound, a
maturity swap where the Fed would sell off all of its Treasury holdings of less than one-
year maturity and use the proceeds to retire Treasury debt from the long-end, would have
the same effect as buying $400 billion in long-term maturities with newly created re-
serves, and could reduce the 10-year rate by 13 basis points without raising short-term
yields. Neely (2012) examines the effect of the Fed's 2008-2009 QE program on interna-
tional bond yields and exchange rates, and show that the effects are consistent with long-
run purchasing power parity and a simple portfolio balance model. Glick and Leduc
(2012) examine the large-scale asset purchase announcements by the Federal Reserve and
the Bank of England and the impact on global financial and commodity markets. They
present evidence that the announcements led to lower long-term interest rates and depre-
ciations of the U.S. dollar and the British pound on announcement days, while commodity
prices generally declined. Equity prices showed mixed reactions to the announcements
depending on the country in question.
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1.3. Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to examine all of the quantitative easing programs that have
been employed around the world in the past and to see whether the QE announcements
related to them have had a statistically significant impact on stock returns in the short-
term. Moreover, the purpose of this study is also to find whether these announcements
lead to short-term positive abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns. Thorbecke (1997)
states that monetary policy influences a company’s access to credit and when a central
bank employs a quantitative easing program the money supply and consequently the com-
pany’s access to credit are expected to increase. Smaller companies are most likely worse
collaterized and more vulnerable to binding credit constraints than large companies,
therefore the stock returns of the smaller company should be impacted more significantly
when a central bank announces a QE program. This is examined by seeing whether the
abnormal returns and their significance differ between large and small market capitaliza-
tion companies.
1.4. Contribution
Previous literature on QE programs is mostly limited to studies investigating the impact
of QE announcements on interest rates and exchange rates. Glick and Leduc (2012) ex-
amine the large-scale asset purchase announcements by the Federal Reserve and the Bank
of England and the impact on global financial and commodity markets including equity
markets, however, the equity markets are not examined comprehensively or in great de-
tail. They limit their investigation on the impact of the QE announcements by the Fed and
the BoE on S&P 500, S&P/TSX composite, Xetra Dax, Nikkei 225, and FT All shares.
They simply see if the announcement day return is significantly larger than the average
return during the period from January 2004 to July 2011. This thesis extends the study by
Glick  and  Leduc  (2012)  in  several  ways.  First,  all  of  the  QE announcements  made  by
central banks around the world are included. Second, the reaction is examined for com-
panies of different levels of market capitalization by including local all share, large cap,
and small cap indices. Third, a variety of parametric and nonparametric tests are em-
ployed to test if there is a statistically significant impact and to improve the statistical
robustness of the results.
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1.5. Assumptions and Limitations
This study, like most studies in the field of finance, need to include some assumptions for
being able to test whether abnormal returns are present or not. One key assumption is that
the normal or expected return model employed in this study produces reliable estimations
of the indices’ returns. The use of such a normal return model involves the joint hypoth-
esis problem that is present in most finance studies. Even if significant abnormal returns
or cumulative abnormal returns are found surrounding the quantitative easing announce-
ments, it may not necessarily mean that the markets are inefficient. As Campbell et al.
(1997) state:
"If efficiency is rejected, this could be because the market is truly inefficient or
because and incorrect equilibrium model has been assumed. This joint hypothe-
sis problem means that market efficiency as such can never be rejected".
Additionally, it is assumed that there are no other significant events affecting the index
returns during the test window. It is always possible that there some global or local event
during the test window that causes a reaction in one or all of the indices tested in this
study.
Another issue can be that some of the quantitative easing announcements may have al-
ready been expected by the market and therefore may not lead to a significant reaction in
the index returns or may lead to a reaction of a different sign than if the announcement
was not expected. For example, on 22nd of October, 2015, Mario Draghi, the president
of the European Central Bank, said that the central bank is ready to adjust the size, com-
position and duration of its QE programme and that policymakers' measures would need
to be re-examined at their December 3 vote. Investors interpreted this as a signal to buy,
which lead to a sharp increase in the prices of European assets. (Financial Times, 2015).
On December 3rd, 2015, when the ECB extended the duration of the QE programme and
to included municipal bonds in addition to standard government debt, the investors were
not impressed as they were expecting more monthly bond purchases. The Eurofirst 300
index suffered its worst day since August 24, and pushed the S&P 500 down into negative
territory for the year 2015 again.  (Financial Times, 2015)
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International stock market integration can impact the results. For example, a quantita-
tive easing announcements by the FED can and most likely do impact the returns of
stock indices around the world. The returns of the MSCI World Index ex USA are used
in estimating the U.S. stock index normal returns. This can pose an issue, because if the
MSCI index would react to the Fed announcement, it would impact the abnormal re-
turns of the U.S. stock index. If the MSCI index reacted similarly as the local U.S. stock
index to the announcement, the abnormal return of the U.S. index could be insignificant
even if it did clearly react to the announcement.
The fact that there has only been 17 quantitative easing announcements of this particular
type can be an issue in terms of the statistical robustness of the results. Naturally, if there
were more announcements, the robustness of any statistical inferences drawn from the
results would be improved. Additionally, different event study methodologies have dif-
ferent inherent weaknesses. This will be dealt with by employing several different types
of event study tests.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESIS
This section includes an overview of the literature related to the topics of this study fol-
lowed by the development of the hypotheses.
2.1. Market Efficiency
One of the key theoretical aspects related to studying the effect of quantitative easing
announcements on stock returns is the efficiency of the stock markets. According to Fama
(1970), market efficiency causes current stock prices to always incorporate and reflect all
relevant information. This famous concept is known as the efficient market hypothesis.
If this hypothesis was true, the current stock prices would be correct and all relevant new
information would lead to an immediate price reaction. When central banks employ quan-
titative easing, they do this with the objective that the money received by the sellers of
the securities involved in the QE would spill into lending into the broader economy which
in turn would drive asset prices up and remove deflationary pressure. The QE announce-
ments contain relevant information that should impact the economy as a whole, including
the companies operating in that country or area. Thus the stock prices in that economy
should react immediately to such announcements.
Price
new information arrives Time
Figure 1. Market efficiency and positive news
18
2.1.1. The Three Forms of Market Efficiency
Fama (1970) divides market efficiency into three common forms. The weak-form effi-
ciency is the least rigorous form of EMH and is concerned with historical information
about the share prices.  According to it, there are no patterns to stock prices and thus must
move randomly. Kendall (1953) introduced the theory of stock prices following a random
walk in his study where he studied stock and commodity prices and found no patterns in
the prices. If markets are weak-form efficient, excess returns cannot be earned consist-
ently using investment strategies based on historical share prices. This would imply that
technical analysis is not useful in the long run. In the semi-strong-form efficiency, share
prices reflect all relevant publicly available information in an unbiased way. Share prices
should adjust quickly to reflect any new relevant information. This would imply that nei-
ther fundamental analysis nor technical analysis can be used to produce excess returns
consistently in the long run. In the strong-form of market efficiency, share prices reflect
all relevant public and private information. According to it, no one, including insiders,
can earn excess returns.
Several researchers have studied the efficient market hypothesis and the three forms of it.
Academics disagree on the validity of the efficient market hypothesis. There are numer-
ous proponents and opponents of the theory. In support of the weak-form, Fama (1965)
found  that  the  serial  correlation  coefficients  for  a  sample  of  30  Dow  Jones  Industrial
stocks were significant, but too small to cover transaction costs of trading. Similar studies
have mostly found similar results across other countries and time periods. In contrast,
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) provide evidence against the weak-form market efficiency
in the form of a trading strategy based on short-run momentum that yield a compounded
excess return of 12.01% per year on average. In support of the semi-strong-form, Fama
et al. (1969) show that stock prices display no abnormal performance following stock
splits. In contrast, Bernard and Thomas (1989) provide direct evidence against the semi-
strong-form in their study of quarterly earnings surprises. Larger positive (negative) earn-
ings surprises lead to higher positive (negative) abnormal returns and the upward (down-
ward) drift in the stock price continues for months after the earnings announcement. Jaffe
(1974) and Rozeff and Zaman (1988) argue against the strong-form by providing evi-
dence of insider trades being profitable.
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According to Keane (1983), different forms of market efficiency are inclusive of each
other in the following way. If  the market is  efficient on the strong-form level it  is  also
efficient on the semi-strong and weak-form levels, and if the market is efficient on the
semi-strong level it is also efficient on the weak-form level. The following figure illus-
trates these relationships.
Figure 2. The three forms of market efficiency and their relation to each other
The most important form of efficiency for this study is the semi-strong form as quantita-
tive easing announcements are public and do not contain any past asset price information.
The issue of interest is that do the stock markets react to these announcements and
whether the reaction is immediate or not. This study employs a variety of event study
tests to examine the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the
announcements. It can be interpreted as a sign of market inefficiency if the cumulative
abnormal returns are significant and drift upwards for a several days or weeks after the
announcements.
STRONG
All public &
private
information
SEMI-STRONG
All public
information
WEAK
Historical
price
information
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2.2. The Small Cap Anomaly
According to Thorbecke (1997), monetary policy influences firms’ access to credit and
when a central bank employs a quantitative easing program the money supply and conse-
quently firms’ access to credit are expected to increase. Small companies are most likely
worse collaterized and thus less immune from binding credit constraints than large com-
panies, therefore the small firms’ stock returns should be impacted more significantly
when a central bank announces a QE program. This study investigates whether the reac-
tion of small cap stock returns is actually any different from large cap stock returns, and
if it is, is the reaction more positive for small caps.
The literature concerned with anomalies identifies firm size as one of the factors that
explain stock returns. Firm size is measured by the market value of the firm's stock. Banz
(1981) was the first researcher to observe the size effect in his study where he examined
the relationship between the total market value of the firm's stock and the return of the
firm's stock. He found a significant inverse relationship between firm size and stock re-
turns and observed that firm size is a significant factor in explaining stock returns.
After this researchers have argued whether size truly is a significant factor in explaining
stock returns or not. The findings of Banz (1981) were met with skepticism by Lo &
MacKinlay (1990) and Black (1992) who argued that studies of firms sorted on size result
in empirical artifacts, data snooping is present and such tests were not motivated by any
theory linking size to returns. Berk (1995) defends Banz's findings by arguing that em-
pirical observation of the size effect should be recognized even if no underlying theory is
offered to explain the phenomena. Additionally, Berk links the size effect to the prior
classical financial theory of stock returns being related to risk. Fama & French (1992)
present evidence of size being an important factor for explaining returns over long hori-
zons. Horowitz et al. (2000) observe that there is substantial support among practitioners
and researchers that size is an important factor in explaining stock returns in the long-run.
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2.3. Central Banks and Monetary Policies
Abel et al. (2014) define monetary policy as the government's decisions about how much
money to supply to the economy. It is one of the two principal tools available to central
banks for affecting macroeconomic behavior. The changes in money supply affects nom-
inal variables such as the nominal exchange rate and the price level, furthermore, in the
short run monetary policy affects real variables such as the unemployment rate, the real
interest rate, and the real GDP. As monetary policy has such significant economic effects,
the announcements and actions of central banks are closely monitored by the financial
market participants, media, and the general public. Central banks can affect the money
supply by conducting open-market operations, changing reserve requirements, engaging
in discount window lending, and changing the reserve deposit rate.
Open market operations are used by central banks as the primary means of implementing
their monetary policy. They are the most direct way for a central bank to change the
money supply. An open market operation is an activity where a central bank buys or sells
government bonds on the open market with the objective of affecting the money supply.
For example, if a central bank wishes to increase the money in the economy, they buy
securities from private investors in the bond market. As the central bank pays for the
securities, the increase in the economy's money supply is significantly larger than the
original purchase amount because of the process of multiple expansion of loans and de-
posits, in which fractional reserve banking increases the economy's loans and deposits.
This process will  stop only when the reserves of the banking system equal the reserve
requirement. Reserve requirement is the minimum fraction of each type of deposit that
banks must hold as reserves. If a central bank has the objective of increasing the money
supply they can decrease the reserve requirement. By doing so they force banks to hold
less reserves which increases the money multiplier and the money supply. Discount win-
dow lending occurs when a central bank lends reserves to banks. Discount window lend-
ing increases the monetary base and money supply. Reserve deposit rate is the interest
rate that a central bank pays on banks' reserve deposits at the central bank. If a central
bank aims for an increase in the money supply, they reduce the interest rate they pay on
reserves which encourages banks to hold less in reserves and leads to a increase in the
money multiplier and the money supply.
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2.3.1. Unconventional Monetary Policies: Quantitative Easing
According to Keynes (1936), monetary policy ceases to be an effective instrument to
combat economic contraction in a situation where interest rates have fallen so low that
further expansion of the money supply cannot drive them lower. Particularly since the
2007 financial crisis, interest rates close to the zero lower bound have become a common
occurrence in many economies around the world and consequently many central banks
have adopted the use of unconventional monetary policies. According to Joyce et al.
(2012), the most high-profile type of unconventional monetary policy has been Quantita-
tive Easing (QE). In Quantitative Easing, a central bank purchases government securities
from the banking sector and/or the financial market with the objective that the money
received by the sellers of these securities would spill over into lending into the broader
economy which in turn would help drive asset prices up and remove deflationary forces.
As of today, countries or areas including Japan, the U.S., United Kingdom, the Euro-area,
and Sweden have engaged in one or several rounds of Quantitative Easing.
According to Joyce et al. (2011), the immediate effect of monetary policy purchases of
securities is that the balance sheet of the central bank expands and the amount of central
bank money increases. When the central bank purchases a bond from a bank, there is a
direct growth in the monetary base as the bond is added to the assets side of the central
bank's balance sheet and the central bank credits the seller bank's current account at the
central bank with electronic central bank money. This initial effect can be referred to as
the impact phase. However, Newby and Orjasniemi (2015) state that such a growth in
central bank money or liquidity in the banking system does not automatically mean an
increase in the amount of held by households and non-financial corporations. The in-
creased liquidity flows into the real economy only if banks increase their lending to these
households and non-financial corporations. Thus, the [central bank] cannot directly stim-
ulate loan markets and increase aggregate demand or supply with asset purchases. This
second phase is called the adjustment phase, and it takes longer to yield results than the
impact phase. In addition, there are several factors that influence the transmission that are
independent of central bank measures, such as the structures of the economy and the ac-
cumulation of private sector debt.
Quantitative Easing programmes are transmitted to the real economy and prices via vari-
ous transmission channels. These transmission channels are discussed in the next section.
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2.3.2. The Transmission Channels of Non-Conventional Central Bank Policies
There are several channels through which non-conventional central bank policies, such
as large-scale asset purchase programmes may affect long-term interest rates, financial
markets and economies in general.
According to Glick and Leduc (2012), the first channel through which central bank large-
scale asset purchases may affect long-term interest rates is portfolio balance effects that
effectively cause a reduction in the overall supply of longer-term securities available to
investors. This reduction in the stock of long-term securities held by the private sector
drive up the price of these securities, lower the term premium required by the investors,
and consequently lower long-term interest rates.
The second channel is through policy signaling effects. Asset purchase announcements
may signal about the central bank's perception of the economic conditions and about how
it will most likely react to future developments. If an announcement signals that condi-
tions are worse than they originally perceived or heightens concerns related to risk, the
demand for Treasuries by the investors may increase, lowering their yields. Large-scale
asset purchases can also signal that short-term risk free interest rates would stay low. Such
an expectation will lower long-term rates.
The third channel is through liquidity effects. Central bank large-scale asset purchases
can improve market functioning during times of distress through actively encouraging
trading. This can lead to increases in asset prices due to lower illiquidity premia.
Bank of England (2012) also mention that Quantitative Easing may also have a stimula-
tory impact through its broader effects on expectations. If the economic outlook improves
as a result of Quantitative Easing, it may directly boost consumer confidence, and conse-
quently people's willingness to spend. Some of this improvement in confidence can also
lead to higher asset prices, especially by reducing risk premiums.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) point out several other transmission chan-
nels of asset purchases, such as lowering of mortgage prepayment risk if the asset pur-
chases involve mortgage-backed securities, the lowering of corporate default risk, and the
raising of inflation expectations.
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2.4. International Stock Market Integration
International stock market co-movement and integration is a relevant issue for this study
as this study examines the local stock index reaction to the local central bank’s quantita-
tive easing announcement using the appropriate world index as a benchmark. If the quan-
titative easing announcement of the Fed leads to a reaction in the foreign indices, and
consequently in the world index, this can dilute the impact we see in the local indices with
respect to the abnormal returns employed in this study.
Numerous researchers have investigated if and how stock markets around the world co-
move. According to Berben and Jansen (2005), the Japanese stock market is generally
weakly correlated with the stock markets of other developed countries. Rua and Nunes
(2009) study the international co-movement of stock returns by employing wavelet anal-
ysis that  allows one to assess the time- and frequency-varying co-movement within an
unified framework. They describe how the degree of co-movement of the German market
with the US and UK markets has not been stable. In fact, the co-movement has been
characterized by a gradual but steady increase at the lower frequencies and by a sudden
increase for the other frequencies after then end of the nineties. Nikkinen et al. (2006)
examine the integration between global stock markets with respect to the U.S. macroeco-
nomic news announcements. They show that the developed Asian countries, the emerging
Asian countries, the G7 countries and the European countries other than G7 countries are
closely integrated with respect to U.S. macroeconomic news announcements. However,
they find that Latin American and Transition economies are not affected by these news.
Wongswan (2009) documents and provides evidence of a large and significant response
of 15 foreign equity indices in Asia, Europe, and Latin America, on U.S. monetary policy
announcement surprises. The announcement surprises affect the foreign equity indices
through their discount rate component. Wongswan's findings suggest that U.S. monetary
policy can be a risk factor in equity markets around the world. Hausman and Wongswan
(2011) study the impact of U.S. monetary policy announcement surprises on global asset
prices. They provide direct evidence that these announcement surprises affect global asset
prices, and this effect varies greatly across countries depending on the country's exchange
rate regime. Equity indices and interest rates in more flexible exchange rate regime re-
spond less to U.S. monetary policy surprises, and vice-versa. Moreover, the percentage
of each country's equity market capitalization owned by U.S. investors is strongly related
to the cross-country variation in the foreign equity market response.
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2.6. Development of Hypothesis
This study will test if the central bank quantitative easing announcements have a statisti-
cally significant impact on stock index returns in the short-term. Moreover, based on pre-
vious literature, this impact is expected to be positive and larger for companies with
smaller market capitalization.
Abel et al. (2014) state that monetary policy and the resulting changes in the money sup-
ply affect the economy significantly through changes in the price level, nominal exchange
rate, real GDP, real interest rate, and the unemployment rate, thus central bank announce-
ments and actions are closely monitored by the participants in the financial markets, the
media, and the general public. Additionally, according to Joyce et al. (2012), the Bank of
Japan engaged in quantitative easing with the hope that the resulting boost in the level of
cash reserves the banks held in the system would eventually spill over into lending into
the broader economy, helping drive asset prices up.
 H1:  QE announcements have a statistically significant impact on stock returns in
   the  short-term
The changes in stock prices reflect investor's expectations of the future. Bank of England
(2012) points out that Quantitative Easing may lead to higher asset prices due to its stim-
ulatory impact on expectations, consumer confidence, and people's willingness to spend.
 H2:  QE announcements lead to positive abnormal returns in the short-term
Thorbecke (1997) states that monetary policy shocks exert an important and statistically
significant effect on small firm returns. Larger firms are most likely better collaterized
and thus more immune from binding credit constraints. Thus the stronger effect of mon-
etary shocks on small firms compared to large firms is consistent with the hypothesis that
monetary policy works by influencing firms' access to credit. The money supply and con-
sequently firms’ access to credit are expected to increase when a central bank implements
a quantitative easing program, thus the reaction of small firms should be more heightened.
 H3:  QE announcements lead to larger positive abnormal returns for companies with
   smaller market capitalization
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3. EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY
Economists have employed various event study methodologies to measure the effect of
an event on the value of a firm since the 1930s when Dolley examined the effect of stock
splits on the stock price (Campbell et al., 1996). Generally, significance tests can be
grouped into two groups, parametric and nonparametric tests. Parametric tests assume
that abnormal returns are normally distributed, whereas nonparametric tests do not rely
on any assumptions concerning the distribution of the abnormal returns (Brown and
Warner, 1980). A vast number of parametric event studies have been done since Dolley
(1933). Myers and Bakay (1948), Baker (1956, 1957, 1958), and Ashley (1962) improved
the methodology by removing general stock price movements and separating out con-
founding events. Ball and Brown (1968) considered the information content of earnings
and Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) investigated the effects of stock splits after
removing the effects of simultaneous increases in dividends. Patell (1976) introduced the
Patell Test that is immune to the way in which abnormal returns are distributed across the
event window. Campbell and Wasley (1993), Maynes and Rumsey (1993), Cowan and
Sergeant (1996), and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) showed that the Patell Test is prone to
cross-sectional correlation and event-induced volatility. Boehmer, Musumeci and
Poulsen (1991) presented the Standardized Cross-Sectional Test which accounts for
event-induced volatility and serial correlation but is still prone to cross-sectional correla-
tion. Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) introduced the Adjusted Patell Test and the Adjusted
Standardized Cross-Sectional Test which are immune to cross-sectional correlation.
Generally nonparametric tests tend to be more powerful than parametric tests due to the
normal distribution assumption of parametric tests. Wilcoxon (1945) presented the Wil-
coxon Signed-rank Test which considers both the sign and magnitude of ARs are im-
portant. Cowan (1992) introduced the Sign Test and the Generalized Sign Test which
compares the share of positive abnormal returns close to an event to the proportion from
a normal period. The tests account for skewness in security returns but perform poorly
for longer event windows. Corrado and Zivney (1992) presented the Corrado Rank Test
which has proven robust against event induced volatility and cross-correlation. Kolari and
Pynnönen (2011) presented the Generalized Rank Test which accounts for cross-correla-
tion of returns, returns serial correlation, and event induced volatility. The test is one of
the most powerful tests for both shorter and longer cumulative abnormal return windows.
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According to Campbell  et  al.  (1996),  an event study consists of seven steps which are
discussed next.
3.1. Event Definition
The first task in conducting an event study is defining the event of interest and identifying
the event window, which is the period over which the security prices of the firms of in-
terest involved in the event will be examined.
In this study the events of interest are the quantitative easing announcements of central
banks where they announce the quantitative easing policy to the public for the first time
and / or announce the continuation of the said policy. Up to this day there has been 17 of
such quantitative easing announcements:
Central Bank Date of QE announcement
Bank of Japan    19.3.2001
   5.10.2010
   4.8.2011
   19.9.2012
   4.4.2013
   31.10.2014
The Federal Reserve   25.11.2008
    3.11.2010
    13.9.2012
    12.12.2012
Bank of England     5.3.2009
          7.5.2009
          6.8.2009
          5.11.2009
European Central Bank   22.1.2015
          3.12.2015
Bank of Sweden     12.2.2015
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The central banks will be referred to as BoJ, FED, BoE, ECB and BoS from now on. After
the event of interest and the event dates have been identified, the next step is to define the
event window, which is the period of time surrounding the event date when the effect of
the event is examined. The event window is set up on the basis of the number of trading
days preceding and following the event date to account for any possible leakage of infor-
mation prior to the event date and to allow for some additional time for the event to reach
and affect the stock market. This study will follow Filbien and Fabien (2009) who state
that an event window with 5 days prior to ECB meeting (from t-5 to t0) helps to capture
any information about ECB communication revealed in that period. The post-event win-
dow (or the test window) is extended to t+30 to examine whether the market processes the
quantitative easing announcement and stock prices change instantly, as it should accord-
ing to the efficient market hypothesis, or the market processes the announcement and the
stock prices change slowly in contrast with the EMH. By setting the event window from
5 days prior and 30 days after the event date, it allows for leakage, forecast and post-
announcement effect to have an impact on the stock indices.
3.2. Selection Criteria
After identification of the event of interest, in most event studies the next step is to deter-
mine the selection criteria used to determine which firms are to be included in the study,
or which indices in the case of this paper.
3.3. Normal, Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal Returns
To determine the impact of the event in question we must have a measure of the abnormal
return. Firstly, return is simply calculated as the natural logarithm of today's index value
divided by yesterday's index value. For each index and date we have:
(1)
ܴ௜௧ = ݈݊ ቆ ݅݊݀݁ݔ	ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜,௧݅݊݀݁ݔ	ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜,௧ିଵቇ
where Ri,t is the return for time period t.
The normal return is the return that would be expected if the event did not occur. There
are several models available to calculate the normal return of a given security. The models
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can be grouped into two categories, statistical and economic. Statistical models do not
depend on any economical arguments and contain statistical assumptions regarding the
behavior of asset returns. Economic models rely on assumptions regarding investor be-
havior, but in practice some statistical assumptions are necessary. In the case of the sta-
tistical models, an assumption is conventionally made that asset returns are jointly multi-
variate normal and independently and identically distributed through time. According to
Campbell et al. (1996), inferences from using the normal returns models are robust to
deviations from the assumption. The two classical statistical models to calculate the nor-
mal return are the constant-mean-return model and the market model. The constant-mean-
return  model  is  perhaps  the  least  complex  as  it  assumes  that  the  normal  return  of  any
given security is simply its average return in the past. For any security we have:
(2) ܴ௜,௧ = ߤ௜
where Ri,t is the return for security i on day t and μi is the average return of security i in
the past.
The market model is a regression-based statistical model which relates the return of a
security to the return of the market portfolio. This model's linear specification follows
from the assumption of joint normality of asset returns. For any security we have:
(3) ܴ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜ܴ௠,௧ + ߝ௜,௧
ܧൣߝ௜,௧൧ = 0						ܸܽݎൣߝ௜,௧൧ = ߪఌ೔ଶ
where Ri,t is the return for security i on day t, αi is the intercept term, βi is the beta coeffi-
cient that measures the sensitivity of the security's returns to market returns, Rm,t is the
market return on day t and εi,t is the error term.
As this study concerns entire indices instead of individual securities, the security is re-
placed with the appropriate local index and the market portfolio is replaced with the ap-
propriate world index. The methodology used to define the normal (or expected) return
of the indices of relevant countries and areas is motivated by previous studies of the time
series  variability  of  stock  returns,  such  as  Edmans  et  al.  (2007).  The  normal  return  is
defined by the following formula:
30
(4)
ܴ௜,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ1௜ܴ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚ2௜ܴ௠,௧ିଵ + ߚ3௜ܴ௠,௧ + ߚ4௜ܴ௠,௧ାଵ + ߝ௜,௧
where Ri,t is the return on the stock market index for country (or area) i on day t measured
in local currency and Rm,t is the return on the MSCI World Index (and its various versions
employed in this study) on day t.
Several authors have shown that first-order serial correlation is present in time series
measuring stock returns. For example, Brock et al. (1992) found positive first-order serial
correlation at the 1% significance level in their full sample of Dow Jones Industrial Av-
erage index daily returns from 1897 to 1986. Ri,t-1 is included to account for this phenom-
enon. Return on local indices are correlated across countries and regions to some extent,
thus the return on the appropriate global MSCI World Index is used to estimate the normal
return for each index. Indices of some countries or regions may be lagging or leading the
world index, therefore the model also includes Rm,t-1 and Rm,t+1.
Next the abnormal return can be calculated. The abnormal return is the actual return of
the day minus the expected or normal return of that day. For each index and date we have:
(5) ܣܴ௜,௧ = 	 ܴ௜,௧ − ܧܴ௜,௧
where ARi,t, Ri,t and ERi,t are the abnormal, actual and normal returns for time period t.
The average abnormal return (AAR) is simply the sum of the abnormal return for each
index divided by the number of indices.
In addition to abnormal returns, this study examines cumulative abnormal returns. Cumu-
lative abnormal return is defined as the sum of abnormal returns from time period t1 to
t2. For each index and time interval we have:
(6)
ܥܣܴ௜,௧ଵ,௧ଶ = ෍ ܣܴ௜,௧௧ଶ
௧ୀ௧ଵାଵ
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where CARi,t1,t2 is the cumulative abnormal return of index i from day t1 to t2 and ARi,t
is  the  abnormal  return  for  index  i  on  day  t.  The  cumulative  average  abnormal  return
(CAAR) is simply the sum of the abnormal return for each index divided by the number
of indices.
3.4. Estimation Procedure
Once the normal return model has been chosen, the parameters of the model must be
estimated using the estimation window. Usually, the time period prior to the event win-
dow is used for the estimation window to prevent the event from influencing the normal
return model parameter estimates. The length of the estimation window depends on the
researcher. It should not be so short that the estimated parameters become inefficient due
to  lack  of  observations  and  it  should  not  be  so  long  that  fundamental  market  and  firm
changes cause bias in the parameters. Mackinlay (1997) states that when the estimation
period is sufficiently long, the conditional variance approaches the disturbance variance
and thus eliminates the additional variance due to the sampling error in α and β, which
otherwise could lead to problems with serial  correlation. According to Bartholdy et  al.
(2007), the standard estimation period is 200 to 250, thus 250 days are used in this study
(if the required data is available). In the case of the U.S. estimation period, the daily data
for  the  Wilshire  5000 that  is  used  as  a  proxy for  the  entire  U.S.  stock  market,  is  only
available for 240 days prior to the first event date, thus a 240-day estimation period is
used for studying the U.S. quantitative easing announcements.
estimation window test window
t = -250 t = -5 t = 0 t = +30
event date
Figure 3. Estimation and test window
This figure is a graphical representation of the estimation window specified above and the test window that
was specified in section 3.1.
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This study has a single estimation period for the quantitative easing announcements of
the BoS, the ECB, the BoE, and the FED, while the BoJ’s QE announcements have two
estimation periods. The BoS and ECB have both made only one QE announcement, thus
naturally  they  only  have  single  estimation  periods.  The  BoE  made  their  four  QE  an-
nouncements within the year 2009, consequently only one 250-trading day estimation
period must be used to prevent the events from influencing the normal return model pa-
rameter estimates. The time between each of the FED’s three QE announcements was less
than two years, thus a single estimation period is deemed sufficient and should yield sim-
ilar results to three separate estimation periods. The BoJ released their first QE announce-
ment in 2001, the second one more than 9 years later in 2010, and the remaining four
once a year, thus a pre-2001 announcement estimation period and a pre-2010 announce-
ment estimation period are deemed appropriate for the purposes of this study.
3.5. Testing Procedure
As has been mentioned earlier in the literature review section of this study, both paramet-
ric and nonparametric tests can and should be used to investigate the reaction of security
returns to an event and to test the abnormal returns caused by the event. Both types of
tests have different types of advantages and weaknesses, thus they complement each other
and increase the reliability and statistical robustness of the results.
3.5.1. Parametric Tests
All of the following parametric tests test the hypotheses of whether abnormal returns
and/or cumulative abnormal returns equal zero for each index separately and/or together.
ܪ଴:	ܣܴ௜,௧ = 0
ܪ଴:	ܥܣܴ௜,௧ଵ,௧ଶ = 0
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Traditional T Test
There is a wide variety of parametric tests that have been employed in the numerous event
studies done in the past. The simplest parametric test is the traditional T test. Several
studies such as Masulis (1980), Brown and Warner (1985), Corrado and Zivney (1992),
Beneish and Gardner (1995) and many others have used the following test statistics, as-
suming abnormal returns are independent across securities.
To test the abnormal returns of each index together, we have:
(7) ݐ	ݏݐܽݐ݅ݏݐ݅ܿ௜௧ = 	 ∑ ܣܴ௜,௧
ට∑ߪ௜
ଶ
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for index i on day t and σ2i is the variance of estimation
period residuals of index i.
The cumulative abnormal return is simply the sum of the abnormal returns from day t1 to
t2:
(8)
ܥܣܴ௜,௧ଵ,௧ଶ = ෍ ܣܴ௜,௧௧ଶ
௧ୀ௧ଵାଵ
where CARi,t1,t2 is the cumulative abnormal return of index i from day t1 to t2 and ARi,t
is the abnormal return for index i on day t.
To examine whether the event had effect on cumulative abnormal returns of each index
during the test window, the following test statistic can be used:
(9) ݐ	ݏݐܽݐ݅ݏݐ݅ܿ௜,௧ = 	 ∑ܥܣܴ௜,௧ଵ,௧ଶ
ට(ܭ + 1)∑ߪ௜ଶ
where CARi,t1,t2 is the cumulative abnormal return for index i from day t1 to t2, K is the
number of days in the cumulative abnormal returns (for example, on test window day 1
K equals 1) and σ2i is the variance of estimation period residuals of index i.
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The advantage of the traditional T test is that it is simple to execute but it is somewhat
weak because it implicitly assumes that security residuals are uncorrelated and that event-
induced variance is insignificant, thus additional parametric tests must be conducted.
Standardized-residual Test
According to Boehmer et al. (1991), the standardized-residual test, also known as the
Patell  test,  was introduced by Patell  (1976).  It  is  similar to the traditional T test  in the
sense that it assumes that event-induced variance is insignificant and that security resid-
uals are uncorrelated. In contrast to the traditional test, the residuals are standardized be-
fore forming portfolios for two reasons. Firstly, it adjusts for the event-period residual is
an out-of-sample prediction and thus will have a higher standard deviation than estima-
tion-period residuals. Secondly, when event-period residuals are standardized before
forming portfolios, heteroscedastic event-day residuals are allowed and securities with
large variances are prevented from dominating the test.
The standardized residuals are estimated with the following formula:
(10)
ܴܵ௜,௧ = ܣܴ௜,௧ߪ௜,௧∗
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for index i on day t and σ*i,t is the standard deviation
of the estimation period residuals of index i adjusted to reflect the forecast error.
As the event-window residuals (or abnormal returns) are out-of-sample predictions, Patell
adjusts the standard deviation by the forecast error:
(11)
ߪ௜,௧∗ଶ = ߪ௜ଶ ቌ1 + 1ܶ
௜
+ ൫ܴ௠,௧ − ߤோ೘൯ଶ
∑ ൫ܴ௠,௧ − ߤோ೘൯ଶభ்௧ୀ బ் ቍ
with Ti as the number of days in the estimation period of index i, Rm,t as the market return
on test day t, and μRm as the mean of the market returns in the estimation window. SRi,t is
distributed as a t-distribution with Ti - 2 degrees of freedom under the Null.
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The test statistic can be estimated with the following formula:
(12)
ݐ	ݏݐܽݐ݅ݏݐ݅ܿ௜,௧ = 	 ∑ ܴܵ௜,௧
ඥ#	݋݂	ݏܽ݉݌݈݁	݅݊݀݅ܿ݁ݏ
where SRi,t is the standardized residual for index i on day t.
The cumulative standardized residual (or cumulative standardized abnormal return) is
simply the sum of the standardized residuals from day t1 to t2:
(13)
ܥܴܵ௜,௧ଵ,௧ଶ = ෍ ܴܵ௜,௧௧ଶ
௧ୀ௧ଵାଵ
where CSRi,t1,t2 is the cumulative standardized residual (or cumulative abnormal return)
of index i from day t1 to t2 and SRi,t is the standardized residual (or abnormal return) for
index i on day t.
To examine whether the event had effect on cumulative abnormal returns of each index
during the test window, the following test statistic can be used:
(14)
ݐ	ݏݐܽݐ݅ݏݐ݅ܿ௜,௧ = 	 ∑ܥܴܵ௜,௧ଵ,௧ଶ
ඥ(ܭ + 1)	#	݋݂	ݏܽ݉݌݈݁	݅݊݀݅ܿ݁ݏ
where CSRi,t1,t2 is the cumulative standardized residual for index i from day t1 to t2 and
K is the number of days used in calculating the cumulative abnormal returns (for example,
on test window day 1 K equals 1).
Many researchers have improved upon the Standardized Residual Test. Kolari and Pynnö-
nen (2010) introduced the Adjusted Patell Test and the Adjusted Standardized Cross-
Sectional Test which are both immune to cross-sectional correlation. However, the Stand-
ardized Residual Test is deemed sufficient for this study as cross-sectional correlation is
not an issue. The tests of each index together consist of 15 indices for 15 different events
with test windows that do not overlap each other, thus cross-sectional correlation does
not occur.
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According to Brown and Warner (1980), parametric T tests contain a strong assumption
of security return normality. If this assumption is not met, then the sampling distribution
of test statistics assumed for the hypothesis tests could differ from the actual distribution
possibly resulting in false inferences. Therefore, a number of nonparametric tests are em-
ployed to overcome this issue.
3.5.2. Nonparametric Tests
Prior research related to event studies have employed a wide variety of nonparametric
tests. The Sign Test, Generalized Sign Test, and Corrado Rank Test are deemed appro-
priate for the purposes of this study. These tests and additionally, the Generalized Rank
Test, are described next.
Sign Test
The first and the simplest nonparametric employed in this study is the sign test. Brown
and Warner (1980) state that in the sign test, the null hypothesis is that the proportion of
sample securities having positive measures of abnormal performance is equal to 0.5.
The test statistic is derived using the following formula:
(15)
ݐ	ݏݐܽݐ݅ݏݐ݅ܿ௜ = √ܰ	ቆ ݌௜ − 0.5
ඥ0.5	(1 − 0.5)ቇ
where  N is  the  number  of  days  in  the  test  window and p  is  the  proportion  of  positive
abnormal returns for index i in the test window.
If the proportion of positive cumulative abnormal returns in the test window is greater
than 0.5 at a statistically significant level, the event has had a positive effect on the index
returns.
Boehmer et al. (1991) argue that the problem with this approach is the assumption of 50%
of security returns being negative, while in fact, as Fama (1976) and Brown and Warner
(1980) show they are skewed to the right. Next, the generalized sign test is employed to
address this issue.
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Generalized Sign Test
Cowan et al. (1990) and Sanger and Peterson (1990) allow the null hypothesis to be dif-
ferent from 0.5. This modification of the sign test is called the generalized sign test and
compares the event period proportion of positive returns to the proportion of the estima-
tion period, thus the test takes possible asymmetric return distribution under the null hy-
pothesis into account.
The test statistic is derived using the following formula:
(16)
ݐ	ݏݐܽݐ݅ݏݐ݅ܿ௜ = √ܰ	ቆ ݌௧௘௦௧	௜ − ݌௘௦௧	௜
ඥ݌௘௦௧	௜	(1 − ݌௘௦௧	௜)ቇ
where  N  is  the  number  of  days  in  the  test  window,  ptest i is the proportion of positive
abnormal returns in the test window for index i and pest  i is the proportion of positive
abnormal returns in the estimation period for index i.
If the proportion of positive cumulative abnormal returns in the test window is greater
than the proportion of positive abnormal returns in the estimation period at a statistically
significant level, the event has had a positive effect on the index returns.
Cowan (1992) show that the generalized sign test is well specified for event windows of
one to eleven days based on simulation results for portfolios of actual NYSE-AMEX and
NASDAQ stocks, and that the test is correctly specified both when the variance increases
and in the absence of a variance increase, and is more powerful than the cross-sectional
parametric test proposed by Brown and Warner (1985).
Corrado Rank Test
Corrado (1989) propose another nonparametric test, the rank test, and suggest that it is
more powerful in detecting abnormal stock price changes than standard parametric tests.
According to Cowan (1992), the rank test procedure treats the estimation period and the
event period (or the test window) as a single time series, and a rank to each daily return
for each index is assigned.
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The rank statistic for testing on a single day (H0 : AAR = 0) is given by:
(17)
ݐ	ݏݐܽݐ݅ݏݐ݅ܿ௥௔௡௞,௧ = ଵே∑ ൫ܭ௜,௧ − ܭഥ൯ேூୀଵܵ(ܭ)
where N is the number of indices involved, Ki,t is the rank of index i’s abnormal return
on day t, K is the average rank, and the standard deviation S(K) is computed as:
(18)
ܵ(ܭ) = ඩ1ܶ ෍൥෍(ܭ௜௧ −ܭഥ)/ܰே
௜ୀଵ
൩
ଶ்
௧ୀଵ
Next, the methodology of Campbell and Wasley (1993) is followed to define the rank
test considering the sum of the mean excess rank for the event window as follows (H0:
CAAR = 0):
(19)
ݐ	ݏݐܽݐ݅ݏݐ݅ܿ௥௔௡௞ = ∑ܣܭ௧
ඥ(ܭ + 1)	ܵ(ܭ)ଶ
where K is the number of days in the cumulative abnormal returns.
Cowan (1992) suggest that the rank test is more sensitive to an extreme return, and thus
rejects the null hypothesis too often when there is an increase in event window variance.
The rank test generally provides more power than the sign test in detecting abnormal
returns, however this is only when the event window is very short. As the number of days
in the event window increase, the power of the rank test decreases rapidly. Cowan con-
cludes that the rank test performs better than the generalized sign test under ideal condi-
tions, however, the generalized test will be a better choice when the return variance in-
creases on the event date. To overcome these weaknesses, the Generalized Rank Test by
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) is performed.
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Generalized Rank Test
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) argue that the Generalized Rank test outperforms previous
rank tests of CARs and is robust to event-induced volatility and abnormal return serial
correlation. Moreover, the test has superior empirical power relative to parametric tests
by Patell (1976) and Boehmer et al. (1991).
As usual, the standardized abnormal returns are estimated with the following formula:
(20)
ܵܣܴ௜,௧ = ܣܴ௜,௧
ߪ௜,௧
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for index i on day t and σit is the standard deviation of
the estimation period residuals of index i.
The cumulative standardized abnormal return is simply the sum of the standardized ab-
normal returns from day t1 to t2:
(21)
ܥܣܴ௜,ఛ = ෍ ܣܴ௜,௧௧ଵାఛ
௧ୀ௧ଵାଵ
where CARiτ is the cumulative abnormal return of index i during time period τ and ARi,t
is the abnormal return of index i on day t.
The standardized cumulative abnormal returns are estimated with the following for-
mula:
(22)
ܵܥܣܴ௜,ఛ = ܥܣܴ௜,ఛߪ஼஺ோ೔,ഓ
where CARi,τ is the cumulative abnormal return for index i during time period τ and σCARi,τ
is the standard deviation of the residuals in the cumulative abnormal returns of index i.
Boehmer et al. (1991) re-standardize the SCARs with the cross-sectional standard devia-
tion to account for possible event-induced volatility. The event days of this study are not
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clustered, thus cross-sectional correlation does not occur and this step is not deemed nec-
essary.
SCARi t1,t2 is a a zeromean and unit variance random variable, therefore we use SCARi
t1,t2 as one abnormal return and define generalized abnormal returns as follows:
ܩܵܣܴ௜,௧ = ൜ ܵܥܣܴ௜,ఛ	݂݋ݎ	ݐଵ + 1	 ≤ ݐ ≤ ݐଵ + ߬ܵܣܴ௜,௧ 	݂݋ݎ	ݐ = 	 ଴ܶ + 1, … , ݐଵ, ݐଵ + ߬ + 1, … , ଶܶ
The  CAR-period  is  considered  to  be  one  point  in  time  in  which  the  abnormal  return
(GSAR) equals the CAR defined earlier, and for other points in time GSAR equals the
usual standardized abnormal return.
The time indexing is redefined so that the entire CAR-period of length τ is squeezed into
one observation with time index t = 0, hereafter referred to as the cumulative event day.
As the standardized cumulative abnormal return is considered as one observation, we
have L1 + 1 observations in the testing procedure, oh which the first L1 are the estimation
period abnormal returns and the last one is the cumulative return. We define:
(23)
௜ܷ,௧ = ܴܽ݊݇൫ܩܵܣܴ௜,௧൯ܶ + 1 − 12
where Ui,t is the demeaned standardized abnormal rank of the generalized abnormal re-
turns for the set of time indexes including the estimation period for t = T0 + 1,…,T1 and
the cumulative abnormal return for t = 0, with T0 + 1 and T1, the first and last observation
in the estimation period, and T = L1 = T1 – T0 + 1 is the total number of observations,
with L1 = T1 – T0 estimation period returns and the one cumulative abnormal return.
Given that Ui0 is the standardized abnormal rank of the cumulative abnormal return, un-
der the null hypothesis of no mean effect we have:
ܧ( ௜ܷ଴) = 0
for all indices (i = 1,…,n).
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Next, a single t-ratio can be used to test either cumulative or single day abnormal returns
against the hypothesis of no mean event effect. The t-statistic is defined as follows:
(24)
ݐ௚௥௔௡௞ = ܼ ൬ ܶ − 2ܶ − 1 − ܼଶ൰భమ
where
(25)
ܼ = ഥܷ଴
ܵ௎ഥ
with
(26)
ܵ௎ഥ = ඨ1ܶ ෍݊௧݊ ഥܷ௧ଶ
௧∈ఛ
ഥܷ
௧ = 1݊
௧
෍ ௜ܷ௧
௡೟
௜ୀଵ
where nt is the number of valid generalized standardized abnormal returns (GSARit) avail-
able at time point t, t ϵ τ = {T0 + 1,…,T1,0}, T = T1 – T0 + 1 is the number of observations
(T – 1 estimation period observations and the one event observation), and U0 is the mean
Ut for t = 0 (the cumulative abnormal return).
3.6. Empirical Results
Once the formulation of the econometric design is complete, the empirical results are
presented. These empirical results include summary statistics, regression results, abnor-
mal returns and cumulative abnormal returns, and the event study test results.
3.7. Interpretation and Conclusions
Finally, the empirical results from the previous section are interpreted and conclusions
are drawn. Ideally the results will lead to insights concerning the mechanisms by which
the quantitative easing announcements affect index returns.
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4. DATA
This study focuses on entire stock indices instead of a group of individual firms to see
whether the quantitative easing announcements have a market-wide effect. The daily data
of market wide indices that are fairly accurate representations of the entire markets for
the given countries or areas are used to examine the effect on the entire stock market
along with representative large-cap and small-cap indices for the same country or area to
see whether firms of different levels of market capitalization react differently. If available,
a world index that excludes the country or area in question is used to investigate the per-
formance of these indices during the estimation and event windows. If no such index is
available, like in the case of Sweden, the broad world index is used. In 2012, the stock
market capitalization of Sweden accounted for approximately 1 percent of the global
stock market capitalization (theGlobalEconomy.com & Witkowski, W., 2015), thus the
inclusion of it in the world index when examining the Bank of Sweden QE announcement
is not likely to have a significant effect on the results. Table 1 displays the indices used
in this study.
Table 1
The appropriate world indices, and the three types of local indices used in this study
Area World index All-shares index Large cap index Small cap index
Japan MSCI World ex. Japan TOPIX TOPIX 500 TOPIX Small
U.S. MSCI World ex. USA Wilson 5000 S&P 500 Russell 2000
U.K. MSCI World ex. UK FTSE All-Share FTSE 100 FTSE SmallCap
Eurozone MSCI World ex. EMU EURO STOXX TMI EURO STOXX Large EURO STOXX Small
Sweden MSCI World OMX Stockholm OMX Stockholm 60 OMX Stockholm Small Cap
As of August, 2015 the MSCI World Index captures large and mid cap representation
across 23 developed markets countries. It has 1643 constituents and covers approximately
85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in each country (MSCI, 2015). The
MSCI World Index is used as a common benchmark for world of global stock funds, and
thus it, and its various different versions excluding chosen countries or areas, can be
deemed appropriate for the purposes of this study as well.
Additionally, the quantitative easing announcements, and the press releases or statements
related to them were gathered from the websites of each of the central bank that has made
the announcements examined in this study.
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4.1. The Issues with Using Daily Data
According to Brown and Warner (1985), the use of daily data in event studies involves
the following potentially important problems related to this study:
Non-normality
The daily return and the daily excess return for individual stocks exhibit substantial de-
partures from normality that are not observed with monthly data. However, Blattberg and
Gonedes (1974) and Hagerman (1978) suggest that there is some evidence that the distri-
bution of the cross-sectional daily mean return converges to normal as the number of
securities increase, thus as this paper focuses on daily returns and daily excess returns of
entire indices, the severity of this problem diminishes.
Variance estimation
The estimation of the sample mean excess return variance is important for tests of statis-
tical significance for both daily and monthly data. Beaver (1968) and Patell and Wolfson
(1979) propose that the variance of stock returns increases for the days around the event
such as earnings announcements.
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section describes empirical results of this study including the presentation and inter-
pretation summary statistics, regressions results, abnormal returns, and the results from
the parametric and nonparametric tests.
Figure 4. The daily returns of the local all-shares indices on the QE announcement days
5.1. Summary Statistics
Figure 5 shows how the relevant local stock indices performed on average in the 5 trading
days before and 30 trading days after the 17 central bank QE announcements in the Japan,
U.S., England, Europe, and Sweden. It is evident that the relevant local all shares indices,
large-cap indices, and small-cap indices provided higher returns than the comparable
world indices especially during the time period from one day prior to three days after the
QE announcement. The local stock indices of the relevant countries or areas seem to have
had returns of roughly 0,4 to 1% in excess of the world indices during the t-1 to t+3 time
period.
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Figure 5. Daily average returns surrounding the QE announcements
This figure presents the daily average returns of the local stock indices from 5 days before the announce-
ment to 30 days after it. T = 0 is the QE announcement date. All shares indices, Large-cap indices, and
Small-cap indices show the average daily return of the local market-wide indices, large-cap indices, and
small-cap indices of Japan, U.S., U.K., euro area and Sweden surrounding the 17 QE announcements.
World indices shows the average return of the MSCI World Indices used in this study surrounding the QE
announcements.
Figure 6 shows how the relevant local stock indices performed in cumulative terms during
the time period starting from 5 days before the announcement to 30 days after the an-
nouncement. The figure clearly shows how the that the relevant local all shares indices,
large-cap indices, and small-cap indices provided higher cumulative returns than the com-
parable world indices from 5 days prior to the QE announcements to 30 days after the
announcements. Particularly, the small-cap indices seemed to have reacted most signifi-
cantly to the announcements. During this t-5 to t+30 time frame the relevant world indices
on average have produced a cumulative raw return of approximately 2,1% while the rel-
evant all shares indices, large-cap indices, and small-cap indices produced approximately
4,5%, 4,3% and 6,1%. Naturally, such raw returns cannot be the basis any of statistically
robust inferences of the effect of QE announcements on stock returns, however, they are
promising enough to warrant further investigation into the matter.
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Figure 6. Cumulative average returns surrounding the QE announcements
This figure presents the daily cumulative average returns of the local stock indices from 5 days before the
announcement to 30 days after it. T = 0 is the QE announcement date. All shares indices, Large-cap indices,
and Small-cap indices show the cumulative average return of the local market-wide indices, large-cap in-
dices, and small-cap indices of Japan, U.S., U.K., euro area and Sweden surrounding the 17 QE announce-
ments. World indices shows the average return of the MSCI World Indices used in this study surrounding
the QE announcements.
Table  2  shows the  summary  statistics  of  the  relevant  indices  surrounding  the  Bank of
Japan six QE announcements. The world index that excludes Japan had a mean returns
ranging from -0,30% to +0,15% during the six test periods, while the local all-share index,
the large cap index, and the small cap index had mean returns ranging from -0,32& to
+0,48%, -0,33% to +0,49%, and -0,15% to +0,37%. There is evidence of the local indices
reacting strongly to the QE announcements. The 6,13% maximum daily return of the local
all-shares index during the test period far exceeded its 3,05% maximum daily return of
the estimation period. The local large cap and small cap indices behaved similarly.
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The local indices had lower returns on the first and second QE announcement days rela-
tive to the world index. This changed for the remaining four QE announcement days as
the local indices had higher returns relative to the world index.
Table 2
Summary statistics of the relevant indices surrounding the Bank of Japan QE announcements
This table presents the mean, media, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation of the daily returns of the world
index that excludes Japan (MSCI World ex. Japan), the local all-share index (TOPIX), large cap index (TOPIX 500),
and small cap index (TOPIX Small) during the two normal return estimation periods, the six test periods and the six
quantitative easing announcement days presented in percentage units.
QE 1 QE 2 QE 3 QE 4 QE 5 QE 6
Index Estimationperiod 1
Estimation
period 2
Test
period
Test
period
Test
period
Test
period
Test
period
Test
period
MSCI World ex. Japan Mean -0,07 0,03 0,01 0,06 -0,30 0,01 0,15 0,04
Median -0,02 0,07 0,13 0,08 -0,41 0,01 0,37 0,10
Max 3,29 4,77 3,39 1,71 3,68 1,13 1,35 1,29
Min -4,64 -3,14 -3,60 -1,65 -5,56 -1,44 -1,75 -1,74
SD 1,02 1,03 1,65 0,62 2,09 0,59 0,67 0,63
TOPIX Mean -0,12 -0,02 0,35 0,04 -0,32 0,02 0,48 0,29
Median -0,15 -0,01 0,11 -0,01 -0,33 0,07 0,15 0,18
Max 3,05 3,51 6,13 2,26 2,15 1,69 3,28 4,19
Min -6,32 -3,54 -3,97 -2,08 -3,12 -2,02 -3,36 -2,48
SD 1,24 1,11 1,90 0,98 1,30 0,93 1,45 1,18
TOPIX 500 Mean -0,11 -0,02 0,34 0,04 -0,33 0,02 0,49 0,30
Median -0,12 -0,01 0,09 0,00 -0,37 0,04 0,14 0,21
Max 3,03 3,57 6,31 2,26 2,11 1,75 3,28 4,28
Min -6,19 -3,59 -4,23 -2,10 -3,16 -2,14 -3,25 -2,50
SD 1,25 1,13 1,97 0,98 1,31 0,96 1,48 1,21
TOPIX Small Mean -0,04 -0,04 0,39 -0,04 -0,15 0,06 0,37 0,20
Median -0,01 -0,02 0,32 -0,05 -0,02 0,10 0,31 0,19
Max 2,89 2,81 3,91 2,24 2,61 1,20 3,19 3,29
Min -7,17 -3,00 -1,94 -2,77 -2,77 -1,35 -4,49 -2,24
SD 1,05 0,99 1,07 0,97 1,26 0,74 1,48 0,91
Index Eventdate
Event
date
Event
date
Event
date
Event
date
Event
date
MSCI World ex. Japan Return 0,83 1,68 -4,19 0,23 -0,13 1,29
TOPIX Return 0,18 1,20 -0,05 0,85 2,67 4,19
TOPIX 500 Return 0,12 1,26 -0,06 0,87 2,68 4,28
TOPIX Small Return 0,48 0,47 0,09 0,60 2,51 3,29
48
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the relevant indices surrounding the four Fed-
eral Reserve QE announcements. There is indication of the local indices reacting to the
QE announcements. All of the local indices had higher mean returns during the test peri-
ods compared to their estimation periods. Additionally, the all-shares and the small cap
indices had lower minimum returns during the test periods relative to the minimum re-
turns of the entire estimation periods. The local indices underperformed the world index
on the first and fourth QE announcement days and outperformed during the second and
third QE announcement days.
Table 3
Summary statistics of the relevant indices surrounding the Federal Reserve QE announcements
This table presents the mean, media, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation of the daily returns of the world
index that excludes the U.S. (MSCI World ex. USA), the local all-share index (Wilson 5000), large cap index (S&P
500), and small cap index (Russell 2000) during the normal return estimation peri-od, the four test periods and the
four quantitative easing announcement days presented in percentage units. Mean* for Event Dates refer  to  that
particular QE announcement day’s return.
QE 1 QE 2 QE 3 QE 4 QE 1 QE 2 QE 3 QE 4
Index Estimationperiod
Test
period
Test
period
Test
period
Test
period
Event
date
Event
date
Event
date
Event
date
MSCI World ex. USA Mean* -0,23 0,02 0,08 0,08 0,19 1,46 -0,21 0,11 0,37
Median 1,87 -0,08 0,04 0,05 0,13
Max 6,54 5,29 1,60 1,60 1,72
Min -7,57 -4,39 -1,43 -1,54 -0,65
SD 1,87 1,98 0,68 0,67 0,44
Wilson 5000 Mean* -0,22 0,01 0,14 0,01 0,19 0,89 0,35 1,54 -0,01
Median 2,30 0,48 0,05 -0,02 0,10
Max 10,77 6,34 2,10 2,01 2,51
Min -9,49 -9,63 -1,68 -1,66 -1,03
SD 2,30 3,42 0,81 0,71 0,67
S&P 500 Mean* -0,22 -0,01 0,13 0,01 0,18 0,65 0,37 1,62 0,04
Median 2,33 0,44 0,07 -0,02 0,08
Max 10,96 6,27 2,14 2,02 2,51
Min -9,47 -9,35 -1,63 -1,67 -1,11
SD 2,33 3,33 0,80 0,72 0,68
Russell 2000 Mean* -0,21 0,07 0,25 -0,03 0,26 1,45 0,32 1,29 -0,67
Median 2,56 0,84 0,32 -0,13 0,11
Max 8,86 7,18 2,53 2,02 2,79
Min -9,95 -12,61 -2,05 -1,94 -0,69
SD 2,56 4,23 1,05 0,78 0,74
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Table 4 displays the summary statistics of the relevant indices surrounding the four Bank
of England QE announcements. There is evidence of the local indices reacting to the QE
announcements positively. The local small cap index had a higher maximum daily return
of 3,77% during the test periods relative to the maximum daily return of 3,05% of the
estimation period. All of the local indices had higher mean returns during the test periods
relative to the estimation periods. The local indices had higher returns on the second and
third QE announcement days compared with the world index. Additionally, the all-share
and small cap indices had higher returns during the first QE announcement day.
Table 4
Summary statistics of the relevant indices surrounding the Bank of England QE announcements
This table presents the mean, media, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation of the daily returns of the world
index that excludes the U.K. (MSCI World ex. UK), the local all-share index (FTSE All-Share), large cap index
(FTSE 100), and small cap index (FTSE Small Cap) during the normal return estimation period, the four test periods
and the four quantitative easing announcement days presented in percentage units. Mean* for Event Dates refer to
that particular QE announcement day’s return.
QE 1 QE 2 QE 3 QE 4 QE 1 QE 2 QE 3 QE 4
Index Estimationperiod
Test
period
Test
period
Test
period
Test
period
Event
date
Event
date
Event
date
Event
date
MSCI World ex. UK Mean* -0,24 0,32 0,04 0,28 0,06 -3,20 -0,35 -0,13 1,12
Median 2,09 0,52 0,12 0,29 0,11
Max 8,82 5,21 2,38 1,41 1,82
Min -7,13 -4,55 -2,54 -2,43 -1,89
SD 2,09 2,08 1,17 0,76 0,86
FTSE All-Share Mean* -0,19 0,21 0,03 0,39 -0,01 -3,09 -0,08 1,02 0,33
Median 2,24 0,28 0,02 0,42 0,22
Max 8,81 4,53 2,36 1,92 2,30
Min -8,71 -5,17 -2,78 -1,87 -3,22
SD 2,24 2,14 1,35 0,89 1,21
FTSE 100 Mean* -0,19 0,16 0,04 0,36 0,00 -3,23 0,05 0,93 0,35
Median 2,34 0,22 0,06 0,42 0,18
Max 9,38 4,76 2,25 1,96 2,31
Min -9,26 -5,48 -2,79 -1,83 -3,23
SD 2,34 2,24 1,35 0,89 1,22
FTSE SmallCap Mean* -0,26 0,51 0,10 0,54 -0,17 -0,40 0,44 2,55 -0,27
Median 1,34 0,64 0,32 0,63 -0,19
Max 3,05 3,77 3,30 2,55 1,43
Min -6,15 -2,62 -4,19 -1,44 -2,68
SD 1,34 1,29 1,30 0,89 0,84
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Table 5 shows the summary statistics of the relevant indices surrounding the two Euro-
pean Central Bank QE announcements. It appears that the local indices reacted positively
to the first QE announcement and negatively to the second one. All of the local indices
had higher mean returns during the first test period compared to their estimation periods
and the mean return of the world index during the first test period. Additionally, the local
indices had higher daily returns on the first QE announcement day compared to the world
index. The opposite was true during the second test period and the second QE announce-
ment day.
Table 5
Summary statistics of the relevant indices surrounding the European Central Bank QE announcements
This table presents the mean, media, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation of the daily returns of the
world index that excludes the EMU area (MSCI World ex. EMU), the local all-share index (EURO STOXX
Total Market), large cap index (EURO STOXX Large), and small cap index (EURO STOXX Small) during
the normal return estimation period, the two test periods and the two quantitative easing announcement days
presented in percentage units. Mean* for Event Dates refer to that particular QE announcement day’s return.
QE 1 QE 2 QE 1 QE 2
Index Estimationperiod Test period Test period Event date Event date
MSCI World ex. EMU Mean* 0,03 0,11 -0,28 1,18 -1,34
Median 0,60 0,55 -0,17
Max 2,15 1,18 1,47
Min -1,93 -0,92 -2,32
SD 0,60 0,55 0,92
EURO STOXX Total Mean* 0,00 0,38 -0,31 1,55 -3,04
Market Median 1,02 0,79 -0,26
Max 3,03 1,87 2,88
Min -3,39 -1,39 -3,04
SD 1,02 0,79 1,38
EURO STOXX Large Mean* 0,00 0,38 -0,32 1,56 -3,39
Median 1,07 0,82 -0,28
Max 3,31 2,04 3,07
Min -3,53 -1,41 -3,39
SD 1,07 0,82 1,45
EURO STOXX Small Mean* -0,01 0,32 -0,25 1,41 -2,14
Median 0,97 0,79 -0,16
Max 3,29 1,97 2,67
Min -2,84 -1,59 -2,17
SD 0,97 0,79 1,23
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Table 6 reports the summary statistics of the relevant indices surrounding the Bank of
Sweden QE announcement. The summary statistics suggest that the local indices reacted
positively to the QE announcement. The local indices had higher mean during the test
period relative to the estimation period and the test period of the world index. Further-
more, the local indices had higher daily returns on the QE announcement day compared
with the world index.
Table 6
Summary statistics of the relevant indices surrounding the Bank of Sweden QE announcements
This table presents the mean, media, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation of the daily returns
of the world index (MSCI World), the local all-share index (OMX Stockholm), large cap index (OMX
Stockholm 60), and small cap index (OMX Stockholm Small Cap) during the normal return estimation
period, the test period and the quantitative easing announcement day presented in percentage units.
Mean* for Event Dates refer to that particular QE announcement day’s return.
Index Estimationperiod Test period Event date
MSCI World Mean* 0,05 0,07 0,89
Median 0,62 0,53
Max 2,25 1,07
Min -1,80 -1,43
SD 0,62 0,53
OMX Stockholm Mean* 0,08 0,12 2,06
Median 0,87 0,80
Max 3,02 2,06
Min -2,74 -1,55
SD 0,87 0,80
OMX Stockholm 60 Mean* 0,08 0,13 2,09
Median 0,90 0,81
Max 2,96 2,09
Min -2,91 -1,51
SD 0,90 0,81
OMX Stockholm Small Cap Mean* 0,04 0,29 2,14
Median 0,73 0,66
Max 2,67 2,14
Min -4,16 -1,51
SD 0,73 0,66
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5.2. Regression Results
Table 7 presents the regression results for the normal or expected return estimation that
was defined in section 3.3. The regression model used in this study attempts to demon-
strate the normal return of the local indices of interest. The normal return is the return that
would be expected if the event of interest did not occur. These coefficients are presented
and discussed because they are used in the estimation of the abnormal returns and, thus
are the foundation of this study. Additionally, it may be of interest to many to see which
indices show signs of first-order serial correlation, and which indices are leading or lag-
ging the world index.
The constant term αi is 0,00 and insignificant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for each regres-
sion. The Japanese index regressions preceding the 2001 announcement have only one
coefficient, β2iRm,t-1, that is significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the Japanese
indices are lagging the world index by one trading day. This is not surprising considering
the fact that the Japanese Standard Time is 9 hours ahead of Coordinated Universal Time
and 14 hours ahead of New York time. Similarly, the Japanese index regressions preced-
ing the 2010 announcement result in β2iRm,t-1 being significant at the 1% level. However,
unlike the pre-2001 regressions, these later regressions result in β3iRm,t being significant.
Additionally, the all share index and the large-cap index display some degree of first-
order serial correlation as the coefficients, β1iRi,t-1, which are the previous day’s return of
the local indices under investigation, are significant at the 5% level. The U.S. regression
produces even stronger results in terms of first-order serial correlation. In this case, the
all share index and the large-cap index have the coefficients for β1iRi,t-1 significant at the
1% level. All of the U.S. index regressions result in the coefficients for the current and
the following trading day’s world index returns being significant at the 1% level. The
U.S. all shares index has a coefficient of 0,91 for the current day’s world index return,
thus it clearly moves in close unison with the world index. The fact that the following
day’s world index return is significant at 1% for the U.S. indices indicates that the U.S.
stock market may be leading the global stock indices. The U.K. regression results for all
shares and large-cap indices show signs of first-order serial correlation. The coefficients
of the previous and current trading day’s world index returns are significant at the 1%
level for local indices. The EURO and Sweden regressions produce very similar results
to the U.K. results. The only significant difference is that the EURO STOXX large-cap
index regression results in the previous day’s world index return being significant only at
the 5% level, and that all the Swedish index regressions result in the coefficient for the
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Table 7
Regression results from normal or expected return estimation
This table presents results from the normal or expected return estimation model defined in section 3.3.
where Ri,t is the return on the local stock market index for country or area i on day t measured in local
currency and Rm,t is the return on the appropriate MSCI World Index on day t. Japan 1 refers to the esti-
mation period preceding the 2001 announcement and Japan 2 refers to the estimation period preceding the
2010 announcement. ***, **, and * refer to significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Slope coefficients, adjusted R-squared values and standard errors from
regressions of the form Ri,t = αi + β1iRi,t-1 + β2iRm,t-1 + β3iRm,t + β4iRm,t+1 + εi
Independent
variable Japan 1 Japan 2 U.S. U.K. EURO Sweden
All Shares indices
αi 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
β1iRi,t-1 0,08 -0,12 ** -0,54 *** -0,49 *** -0,26 *** -0,27 ***
β2iRm,t-1 0,59 *** 0,55 *** 0,09 0,64 *** 0,32 *** 0,33 ***
β3iRm,t 0,13 * 0,25 *** 0,91 *** 0,80 *** 1,18 *** 0,98 ***
β4iRm,t+1 0,07 -0,10 * 0,48 *** -0,02 -0,07 -0,13 **
Adj. R-squared 0,25 0,30 0,65 0,74 0,52 0,55
S.E. of Regression 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
Large-cap indices
αi 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
β1iRi,t-1 0,07 -0,13 ** -0,54 *** -0,51 *** -0,27 *** -0,29 ***
β2iRm,t-1 0,59 *** 0,56 *** 0,07 0,66 *** 0,29 ** 0,32 ***
β3iRm,t 0,13 * 0,26 *** 0,91 *** 0,83 *** 1,24 *** 1,02 ***
β3iRm,t+1 0,07 -0,10 * 0,46 *** -0,03 -0,09 -0,13 **
Adj. R-squared 0,24 0,31 0,64 0,73 0,52 0,55
S.E. of Regression 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
Small-cap indices
αi 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
β1iRi,t-1 0,08 0,00 -0,46 *** -0,01 -0,06 -0,05
β2iRm,t-1 0,51 *** 0,42 *** 0,11 0,27 *** 0,28 *** 0,32 ***
β3iRm,t 0,09 0,19 *** 0,79 *** 0,38 *** 1,02 *** 0,48 ***
β3iRm,t+1 0,02 -0,09 * 0,70 *** 0,02 -0,05 -0,12 *
Adj. R-squared 0,25 0,23 0,55 0,53 0,45 0,25
S.E. of Regression 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01
following day’s world index return being significant at  5% for the local all  shares and
large-cap indices and at 10% for the small cap index.
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The Adjusted R-squareds range from 0,23 (Japan 2; Small cap) to 0,74 (UK; All shares),
which indicate that the variation in the world index returns explain less of the variation
in the Japanese index returns, and the more in the U.K. index returns. This is not a sur-
prising result considering the fact that among these countries or areas investigated in this
study, Japan is the most different in terms of geographical location, culture, etc., and the
only non-western country or area, thus it is only natural that the Japanese market moves
more independently from the world index.
The negatively lagged term for the local index, Ri,t-1, is included to account for first-order
serial correlation. The inclusion of this term may lead to multicollinearity as the model
includes a negatively lagged term for the world index return as well. Even though the
world indices used in this study exclude the local index, except in the case of the Sweden
regression, multicollinearity may still be an issue because most of the indices around the
world are more or less integrated. Variance inflation factors of the regressions are exam-
ined to find out whether multicollinearity is present or not. Multicollinearity is not
deemed to be an issue based on the VIF values that can be seen in table 8. Most of the
VIF values are approximately 2 or less, except for the UK all shares and large cap regres-
sions where the VIF values are approximately 2,5.
Table 8
Variance inflation factors for the normal return regressions
This table presents the variance inflation factors for the lagged local index return independent varia-
ble (Ri,t-1) for the regressions used in estimating the normal return for each index.
All shares Large cap Small cap
Regression
Uncentered
VIF
Centered
VIF
Uncentered
VIF
Centered
VIF
Uncentered
VIF
Centered
VIF
Japan 1 1,03 1,02 1,03 1,02 1,02 1,02
Japan 2 1,09 1,09 1,09 1,09 1,06 1,06
US 2,08 2,06 2,02 2,00 1,85 1,84
UK 2,53 2,51 2,50 2,49 1,65 1,59
EURO 2,04 2,04 2,00 2,00 1,82 1,82
Sweden 2,09 2,07 2,10 2,08 1,26 1,25
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5.3. Abnormal Returns
Table 9 reports the abnormal returns on each of the quantitative easing announcement day
for all shares, large cap, and small cap indices for each country or area where the an-
nouncement was made. Abnormal return is estimated as ARi,t = Ri,t - ERi,t, which is the
difference between the actual return of the local index and the normal or expected return
of the index. All of the six QE announcements by BoJ lead to positive abnormal returns
for the three types of indices in Japan. The mean abnormal return across these six an-
nouncements ranged from +1,58 % for the small cap index to +1,95 % for the large cap
index. The first three QE announcements by the Fed lead to positive abnormal returns for
all of the index types, while the fourth announcement resulted in a negative abnormal
return for all shares and small cap indices in the U.S. The mean abnormal return across
these four announcements ranged from +0,75 % for the small cap index to +0,92 % for
the other indices.  In the U.K.,  the third QE announcement by the BoE lead to positive
abnormal returns for all of the indices, while the opposite was true in the case of the fourth
announcement. The mean abnormal return across the four announcements ranged from
+0,16 % for the large cap index to +0,68 % for the small cap index. In the Eurozone, the
first QE announcement day witnessed positive abnormal returns across all index types,
while the second QE announcement day had negative abnormal returns. In Sweden, on
the day of the BoS QE announcement, abnormal returns ranged from +1,08 % for the
large index to +1,79 % for the small cap index. The mean abnormal return across all of
the QE announcements for all  of the countries and areas ranged from +1,41 % for the
small cap indices to +1,57 % for the all shares and large cap indices.
Figure 7 and figure 8 show the daily average abnormal returns and cumulative average
abnormal returns across all of the QE announcements for the all share, large cap, and
small cap indices. All of the three types of indices have positive daily abnormal returns
on t 0 to t +3. The cumulative average abnormal returns spike upwards on the event date
and remain positive for all of the index types for the remainder of the test period, up to t
+30. The CAARs for all shares and large cap indices are relatively stable after the event
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date and end up at +2,35 % for all shares and +1,90 % for large cap indices. The CAARs
for small cap indices clearly drift upwards after the event date for the remainder of the
test period and end up at +4,92 % on t +30. The upwards drifting of CAARs of the small
cap indices indicate that the market may not be interpreting the information content of the
QE announcements efficiently. If the markets were efficient, the CAARs should be ap-
proximately flat after the announcements.
Table 9
Abnormal returns on Quantitative Easing announcement days
This table presents the daily abnormal returns (%) on the quantitative easing announcement days for the local
all shares, large cap, and small cap indices for each announcement country or area. Abnormal return is esti-
mated as ARi,t = Ri,t - ERi,t. Additionally, the mean abnormal returns across the QE announcements and areas
are reported to see 1) if the AR is different for the 1st announcemend relative to the subsequent announce-
ments, and 2) if the different types of indices react differently on average.
Quantitative Easing announcement
Area and index 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th Mean
Japan
All shares 1,37 1,09 0,96 0,99 3,46 3,67 1,92
Large cap 1,32 1,15 0,97 1,02 3,50 3,75 1,95
Small cap 1,46 0,49 1,03 0,71 2,96 2,84 1,58
U.S.
All shares 2,74 0,25 0,73 -0,04 - - 0,92
Large cap 2,56 0,26 0,84 0,02 - - 0,92
Small cap 3,25 0,25 0,12 -0,61 - - 0,75
U.K.
All shares -0,09 -0,04 1,13 -0,22 - - 0,20
Large cap -0,15 0,15 0,97 -0,32 - - 0,16
Small cap 0,38 0,32 2,78 -0,75 - - 0,68
EURO
All shares 0,23 -1,16 - - - - -0,46
Large cap 0,21 -1,46 - - - - -0,63
Small cap 0,14 -0,46 - - - - -0,16
Sweden
All shares 1,10 - - - - - 1,10
Large cap 1,08 - - - - - 1,08
Small cap 1,79 - - - - - 1,79
Mean
All shares 1,07 0,04 0,94 0,25 3,46 3,67 1,57
Large cap 1,00 0,03 0,93 0,24 3,50 3,75 1,57
Small cap 1,41 0,15 1,31 -0,22 2,96 2,84 1,41
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Figure 7. The average abnormal returns surrounding the QE announcements
Figure 8. The cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the QE announcements
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5.4. Parametric Tests
Table 10 presents the Traditional T test results for the daily average abnormal returns.
The all shares indices have statistically significant positive abnormal returns at the 1 to
5% level on five and one days prior to the announcement, on the announcement day, and
on the second day after the announcement. The large cap indices react similarly. The
small cap indices have significant positive abnormal returns at the 1% level on the day
before the announcement, on the announcement day, and on the second day after the an-
nouncement. Additionally, a significant positive abnormal return on the 5% level is found
on the  fifth  day  after  the  announcement.  The  hypotheses  of  this  study  are  that  the  QE
announcements have a statistically significant impact on stock returns in the short-term,
these announcements lead to positive abnormal returns in the short-term, and that these
announcements lead to larger positive abnormal returns for companies with smaller mar-
ket capitalization. These results confirm the first two hypotheses. There is also some ev-
idence of the third hypothesis being true, at least on the event date when the small cap
indices have a higher abnormal return.
Table 11 shows the Traditional T test results for the cumulative average abnormal returns.
The  CAARs  of  the  all  shares  indices  are  positive  and  significant  at  the  1  to  5%  level
starting from the announcement date up to the fifteenth following day. Additionally, the
CAARs of days t +26 to +28 are significant at the 5% level. The CAARs of the large cap
indices are similar in terms of the sign of the CAAR and the significance of it except for
the t +26 to +28 period. The CAARs of the small cap indices are positive and significant
at the 1% level starting from the announcement date up to the end of the test period ex-
cluding the period from t +9 to +14 when they are significantly positive at the 5% level.
These results confirm all of the hypotheses of this study. Additionally, the efficiency of
the markets can be questioned as the CAARs keep drifting upwards and remain at a sta-
tistically significant level after the announcement date.
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Table 10
Traditional T test results for daily abnormal returns
This table presents the daily average abnormal returns and t-statistics for the test period from t-5 to t+30 sur-
rounding the quantitative easing announcement days across all countries and announcements involved in this
study. The t-statistics are calculated as described in section 3.5.1. formula 7. S1 refers to significant abnormal
return of either direction across all of the QE announcements, while S2 refers to positive abnormal returns
across the QE announcements. ***, **, and * refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
All shares Large cap Small cap
t
AAR
(%) t-stat. S1 S2
AAR
(%) t-stat. S1 S2
AAR
(%) t-stat. S1 S2
-5 0,43 1,67 * ** 0,42 1,58 * 0,41 1,53 *
-4 0,05 0,20 0,05 0,18 0,00 0,01
-3 -0,47 -1,80 * -0,49 -1,83 * -0,51 -1,88 *
-2 0,03 0,13 0,00 -0,01 0,12 0,46
-1 0,54 2,10 ** ** 0,50 1,89 * ** 0,67 2,49 ** ***
0 0,95 3,68 *** *** 0,93 3,50 *** *** 0,98 3,66 *** ***
1 0,30 1,17 0,30 1,13 0,14 0,52
2 1,14 4,39 *** *** 1,18 4,44 *** *** 0,83 3,09 *** ***
3 -0,37 -1,43 -0,32 -1,21 -0,58 -2,17 **
4 0,12 0,46 0,11 0,39 0,04 0,14
5 0,34 1,32 * 0,30 1,14 0,50 1,87 * **
6 -0,24 -0,92 -0,26 -0,96 -0,02 -0,08
7 0,16 0,60 0,16 0,61 -0,04 -0,16
8 -0,38 -1,47 -0,40 -1,51 -0,07 -0,27
9 -0,41 -1,57 -0,43 -1,63 -0,28 -1,05
10 -0,18 -0,70 -0,21 -0,80 -0,03 -0,12
11 0,26 0,99 0,26 0,98 0,14 0,54
12 0,16 0,63 0,15 0,56 0,27 1,01
13 -0,17 -0,64 -0,20 -0,75 0,18 0,66
14 -0,12 -0,48 -0,11 -0,43 0,03 0,12
15 -0,16 -0,61 -0,22 -0,81 0,43 1,59 *
16 -0,26 -1,01 -0,30 -1,14 -0,09 -0,32
17 0,17 0,66 0,17 0,62 0,12 0,45
18 -0,14 -0,54 -0,17 -0,64 0,00 0,00
19 -0,11 -0,41 -0,15 -0,56 0,09 0,32
20 -0,03 -0,10 -0,07 -0,28 0,22 0,82
21 -0,01 -0,03 -0,05 -0,21 0,32 1,18
22 0,06 0,23 0,07 0,27 0,03 0,11
23 0,18 0,69 0,19 0,71 0,36 1,35 *
24 0,16 0,61 0,13 0,50 0,40 1,50 *
25 0,12 0,47 0,10 0,37 0,30 1,10
26 0,37 1,42 * 0,35 1,32 * 0,34 1,25
27 0,30 1,16 0,30 1,14 0,19 0,72
28 -0,29 -1,13 -0,30 -1,14 -0,14 -0,51
29 -0,13 -0,50 -0,09 -0,34 -0,40 -1,51
30 -0,05 -0,20 -0,04 -0,16 -0,06 -0,21
60
Table 11
Traditional T test results for cumulative abnormal returns
This table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns and t-statistics for the test period from t-5 to t+30
surrounding the quantitative easing announcement days across all countries and announcements involved in this
study. The t-statistics are calculated as described in section 3.5.1. formula 9. S1 refers to significant cumulative
abnormal returns of either direction across all of the QE announcements, while S2 refers to positive cumulative
abnormal returns across the QE announcements. ***, **, and * refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level.
All shares Large cap Small cap
t
CAAR
(%) t-stat. S1 S2
CAAR
(%) t-stat. S1 S2
CAAR
(%) t-stat. S1 S2
-5 0,46 1,26 0,45 1,20 0,43 1,12
-4 0,50 1,13 0,49 1,07 0,42 0,91
-3 0,03 0,06 0,00 0,00 -0,07 -0,13
-2 0,05 0,09 -0,02 -0,03 0,06 0,11
-1 0,60 0,95 0,49 0,76 0,71 1,08
0 1,54 2,25 ** ** 1,42 2,01 ** ** 1,68 2,37 ** ***
1 1,86 2,54 ** *** 1,73 2,30 ** ** 1,82 2,40 ** ***
2 3,03 3,90 *** *** 2,95 3,70 *** *** 2,66 3,31 *** ***
3 2,67 3,26 *** *** 2,64 3,13 *** *** 2,06 2,43 ** ***
4 2,78 3,25 *** *** 2,74 3,11 *** *** 2,08 2,34 ** ***
5 3,15 3,52 *** *** 3,08 3,33 *** *** 2,59 2,79 *** ***
6 2,89 3,10 *** *** 2,80 2,91 *** *** 2,56 2,65 *** ***
7 3,07 3,17 *** *** 2,98 2,99 *** *** 2,52 2,51 ** ***
8 2,66 2,66 *** *** 2,55 2,47 ** *** 2,45 2,36 ** ***
9 2,25 2,17 ** ** 2,11 1,98 ** ** 2,16 2,01 ** **
10 2,04 1,92 * ** 1,88 1,71 * ** 2,11 1,91 * **
11 2,29 2,09 ** ** 2,13 1,88 * ** 2,27 1,99 ** **
12 2,51 2,23 ** ** 2,33 2,01 ** ** 2,57 2,19 ** **
13 2,32 2,01 ** ** 2,11 1,77 * ** 2,74 2,28 ** **
14 2,19 1,85 * ** 1,99 1,63 * 2,75 2,24 ** **
15 2,02 1,66 * ** 1,76 1,41 * 3,20 2,54 ** ***
16 1,71 1,38 * 1,40 1,10 3,07 2,38 ** ***
17 1,87 1,48 * 1,56 1,19 3,20 2,43 ** ***
18 1,72 1,33 * 1,37 1,03 3,20 2,38 ** ***
19 1,61 1,22 1,22 0,90 3,29 2,41 ** ***
20 1,59 1,18 1,16 0,84 3,54 2,54 ** ***
21 1,59 1,16 1,11 0,79 3,86 2,72 *** ***
22 1,64 1,18 1,18 0,83 3,89 2,69 *** ***
23 1,82 1,29 * 1,38 0,94 4,26 2,90 *** ***
24 1,99 1,38 * 1,52 1,03 4,67 3,13 *** ***
25 2,11 1,45 * 1,63 1,08 4,98 3,28 *** ***
26 2,50 1,68 * ** 2,00 1,31 * 5,35 3,47 *** ***
27 2,83 1,88 * ** 2,33 1,50 * 5,57 3,56 *** ***
28 2,52 1,65 * ** 2,01 1,28 5,44 3,43 *** ***
29 2,40 1,55 * 1,94 1,21 4,99 3,10 *** ***
30 2,35 1,49 * 1,90 1,17 4,92 3,02 *** ***
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The results from the Standardized Residual tests are very similar to those of the Tradi-
tional T tests. Table 12 presents the Standardized Residual test results for the daily aver-
age abnormal returns and shows how the three types of indices show similar reactions to
the QE announcements. The all shares, large cap and small cap indices all show signifi-
cantly positive standardized residuals at the 1% level on the announcement day and two
days after that. Moreover, the indices display a significant positive reaction at the 5%
level on the 26th trading day after the announcement.  The first  two hypotheses of this
study are clearly confirmed. There is indication of the third hypothesis holding as the
standardized residual and its t-statistic of the small cap indices is larger than those of the
other indices.
Table 13 displays the Standardized Residual test results for the cumulative average ab-
normal returns. The cumulative standardized residuals of the large cap indices are positive
and significant at the 5% level for two days starting from the announcement day. Then
the CSRs are significantly positive at the 1% level up to the eigth trading day after the
announcement, followed by 5% significance for the following 4 days. The CSRs of the
all shares indices show similar behavior, however they are significant and positive at the
5% level on t +26 to +28. The CSRs of the small cap indices show an extremely strong
reaction to the announcements as they are positive and significant at the 1% level from
the announcement day to the end of the 30-trading day test period. These results confirm
all  of  the  three  hypotheses  of  this  study,  all  of  the  types  of  indices  in  this  study  react
significantly and positively to the announcements, and the small cap indices reaction is
stronger and lasts for longer. Furthermore, market efficiency can be questioned on the
basis of these results as well.
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Table 12
Standardized residual test results for daily abnormal returns
This table presents the daily standardized residuals and t-statistics for the test period from t-5 to t+30 surround-
ing the quantitative easing announcement days across all countries and announcements involved in this study.
The t-statistics are calculated as described in section 3.5.1. formula 7. S1 refers to significant standardized re-
siduals of either direction across all of the QE announcements, while S2 refers to significant positive standard-
ized residuals across the QE announcements. ***, **, and * refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
All shares Large cap Small cap
t SR t-stat. S1 S2 SR t-stat. S1 S2 SR t-stat. S1 S2
-5 4,26 1,03 3,96 0,96 4,40 1,07
-4 1,85 0,45 1,73 0,42 1,93 0,47
-3 -2,82 -0,68 -3,04 -0,74 -2,70 -0,66
-2 1,29 0,31 0,81 0,20 4,10 0,99
-1 5,45 1,32 * 4,81 1,17 6,75 1,64 *
0 13,57 3,29 *** *** 13,05 3,17 *** *** 15,37 3,73 *** ***
1 4,59 1,11 4,58 1,11 0,00 0,00
2 18,16 4,41 *** *** 18,51 4,49 *** *** 13,74 3,33 *** ***
3 -5,40 -1,31 -4,70 -1,14 -5,89 -1,43
4 2,11 0,51 1,68 0,41 1,14 0,28
5 5,12 1,24 4,64 1,13 6,21 1,51 *
6 -4,16 -1,01 -4,39 -1,06 -1,38 -0,33
7 2,16 0,52 2,17 0,53 -0,25 -0,06
8 -5,45 -1,32 -5,67 -1,38 -1,16 -0,28
9 -5,85 -1,42 -6,14 -1,49 -2,02 -0,49
10 -1,72 -0,42 -2,12 -0,52 0,47 0,11
11 4,17 1,01 4,05 0,98 4,17 1,01
12 0,96 0,23 0,78 0,19 2,24 0,54
13 -4,77 -1,16 -5,15 -1,25 0,83 0,20
14 -3,09 -0,75 -2,72 -0,66 -2,03 -0,49
15 -2,51 -0,61 -3,23 -0,78 5,82 1,41 *
16 -3,78 -0,92 -4,19 -1,02 -1,42 -0,34
17 2,35 0,57 2,35 0,57 1,17 0,28
18 -1,78 -0,43 -2,13 -0,52 1,44 0,35
19 0,00 0,00 -0,76 -0,18 4,36 1,06
20 -0,76 -0,18 -1,39 -0,34 4,03 0,98
21 0,13 0,03 -0,56 -0,14 6,22 1,51 *
22 1,73 0,42 1,97 0,48 2,25 0,54
23 3,35 0,81 3,45 0,84 6,56 1,59 *
24 2,93 0,71 2,60 0,63 5,91 1,43 *
25 2,13 0,52 1,76 0,43 5,52 1,34 *
26 7,33 1,78 * ** 7,00 1,70 * ** 7,74 1,88 * **
27 4,91 1,19 4,81 1,17 3,69 0,89
28 -5,14 -1,25 -5,12 -1,24 -1,83 -0,44
29 -1,42 -0,34 -0,61 -0,15 -7,59 -1,84 *
30 -0,59 -0,14 -0,31 -0,08 -0,43 -0,10
63
Table 13
Standardized residual test results for cumulative abnormal returns
This table presents the cumulative standardized residuals and t-statistics for the test period from t-5 to t+30 sur-
rounding the quantitative easing announcement days across all countries and announcements involved in this
study.  The t-statistics are calculated as described in section 3.5.1. formula 9. S1 refers to significant cumulative
standardized residuals of either direction across all of the QE announcements, while S2 refers to significant
positive standardized residuals across the QE announcements. ***, **, and * refer to significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
All shares Large cap Small cap
t CSR t-stat. S1 S2 CSR t-stat. S1 S2 CSR t-stat. S1 S2
-5 4,26 0,73 3,96 0,68 4,40 0,75
-4 6,10 0,85 5,69 0,80 6,33 0,89
-3 3,29 0,40 2,65 0,32 3,62 0,44
-2 4,58 0,50 3,46 0,38 7,72 0,84
-1 10,03 0,99 8,28 0,82 14,47 1,43 *
0 23,60 2,16 ** ** 21,33 1,96 * ** 29,85 2,74 *** ***
1 28,19 2,42 ** *** 25,91 2,22 ** ** 29,85 2,56 ** ***
2 46,35 3,75 *** *** 44,42 3,59 *** *** 43,59 3,52 *** ***
3 40,95 3,14 *** *** 39,72 3,05 *** *** 37,69 2,89 *** ***
4 43,06 3,15 *** *** 41,41 3,03 *** *** 38,84 2,84 *** ***
5 48,18 3,37 *** *** 46,05 3,22 *** *** 45,05 3,15 *** ***
6 44,02 2,96 *** *** 41,66 2,80 *** *** 43,67 2,94 *** ***
7 46,17 2,99 *** *** 43,83 2,84 *** *** 43,42 2,81 *** ***
8 40,72 2,55 ** *** 38,16 2,39 ** *** 42,27 2,65 *** ***
9 34,87 2,11 ** ** 32,01 1,94 * ** 40,25 2,44 ** ***
10 33,15 1,95 * ** 29,89 1,76 * ** 40,72 2,40 ** ***
11 37,32 2,13 ** ** 33,94 1,94 * ** 44,88 2,57 ** ***
12 38,28 2,13 ** ** 34,72 1,93 * ** 47,12 2,62 *** ***
13 33,51 1,82 * ** 29,57 1,60 * 47,95 2,60 *** ***
14 30,42 1,61 * 26,86 1,42 * 45,92 2,43 ** ***
15 27,92 1,44 * 23,62 1,22 51,74 2,68 *** ***
16 24,14 1,22 19,44 0,98 50,32 2,54 ** ***
17 26,49 1,31 * 21,79 1,08 51,49 2,55 ** ***
18 24,71 1,20 19,66 0,95 52,93 2,57 ** ***
19 24,71 1,18 18,90 0,90 57,29 2,72 *** ***
20 23,95 1,12 17,51 0,82 61,31 2,86 *** ***
21 24,08 1,10 16,95 0,78 67,53 3,10 *** ***
22 25,81 1,16 18,92 0,85 69,78 3,14 *** ***
23 29,16 1,29 * 22,37 0,99 76,34 3,38 *** ***
24 32,09 1,40 * 24,97 1,09 82,25 3,58 *** ***
25 34,22 1,47 * 26,74 1,15 87,77 3,76 *** ***
26 41,55 1,75 * ** 33,74 1,42 * 95,50 4,03 *** ***
27 46,46 1,93 * ** 38,55 1,60 * 99,19 4,13 *** ***
28 41,33 1,69 * ** 33,42 1,37 * 97,36 3,99 *** ***
29 39,91 1,61 * 32,81 1,33 * 89,77 3,63 *** ***
30 39,32 1,57 * 32,50 1,30 * 89,34 3,56 *** ***
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5.5. Nonparametric Tests
Table 14 presents the Sign test and Generalized Sign test results for each of the QE an-
nouncement for the three types of indices. The Sign test results show a significant positive
reaction at the 1% level for the BoJ's QE announcements 1, 4, 5, and 6 for all of the index
types.  The Generalized Sign test  results show a significant positive reaction at  the 1%
level for announcements 1 and 6 for all shares and large indices, while the reaction is
significantly positive for announcements 1, 4, 5, and 6 for the small cap index. The Sign
test results for the Fed's QE announcements show a significantly positive reaction at the
1 to 5% level for the large cap index for QE announcements 1 to 3, while the first and
second are significant for all shares and small cap indices. Based on the Generalized Sign
test, the Fed QE announcements did not have a statistically significant positive impact on
the indices. The Sign test results for the BoE QE announcements show a significant pos-
itive reaction at the 1% level by the all shares and large cap indices for the third announce-
ment, while announcements 1 to 3 are significant for the small cap index. The Generalized
Sign test shows a significant reaction at the 1% level by the all shares indices for all of
the four announcements, while the large cap index reacted at the same level to the second
and third announcements, and the small cap index to the first three announcements. Both
of the tests show a significant reaction at the 1% level by all of the three types of indices
to the first ECB QE announcement and the BoS announcement. The second ECB an-
nouncement lead to a positive reaction in the small cap index based on both tests. When
all of these QE announcements are examined together, both of the tests show a signifi-
cantly positive reaction by the all shares, large cap, and small cap indices at the 1% level.
These results support the first two hypotheses of this study. There is some indication that
the reaction of the small cap indices has been stronger or more positive.
Table 15 reports the Corrado Rank test results for the daily average abnormal returns and
the cumulative average abnormal returns. In the case of daily AARs there is little evidence
of a significant positive reaction to the announcements by the local stock indices. A single
significant AAR at the 5% level can be seen on t  +2 for large cap indices.  At the 10%
level, all of the indices show a significant reaction on the announcement day.
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Table 14
Sign test and Generalized Sign test results for daily cumulative abnormal returns
This table displays the results from the Sign tests and Generalized Sign tests during the test period of t-5 to
t+30 surrounding the quantitative easing announcement days for the local stock indices of each QE announce-
ment country. "Combined" shows the results from examining all of the QE announcements together. ***, **,
and * refer to statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
All shares Large cap Small cap
Area Sign test
Generalized
Sign test Sign test
Generalized
Sign test Sign test
Generalized
Sign test
Japan
QE announcement 1 *** *** *** *** *** ***
QE announcement 2
QE announcement 3
QE announcement 4 *** *** *** ***
QE announcement 5 *** *** *** ***
QE announcement 6 *** *** *** *** *** ***
U.S.
QE announcement 1 *** *** ***
QE announcement 2 *** *** **
QE announcement 3 **
QE announcement 4
U.K.
QE announcement 1 *** * *** ***
QE announcement 2 * *** * *** *** ***
QE announcement 3 *** *** *** *** *** ***
QE announcement 4 *** *
EURO
QE announcement 1 *** *** *** *** *** ***
QE announcement 2 *** ***
Sweden
QE announcement 1 *** *** *** *** *** ***
Combined *** *** *** *** *** ***
The cumulative average abnormal returns tell a different story. The CAARs of the large
cap indices show a significantly positive reaction at the 5% level on the second and third
day after the announcements. The CAARs of the small cap indices show a significant
positive reaction starting from the announcement day at the 10% level. The level de-
creases to the 5% level on the second day after the announcements, and then increases
back to 10%. Interestingly, the CAARs become significantly positive at the 5% level on
the 23rd day after the announcement and remain there until the end of the test period. The
corrado rank test results for CAARs support all of the three hypotheses of this study.
Moreover, in the case of the small cap indices, there is some indication of the markets not
being efficient.
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Table 15
Corrado Rank test results for daily average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns
This table presents the Corrado Rank test results for the daily average abnormal returns and cumulative average
abnormal returns for the test period from t-5 to t+30 surrounding the quantitative easing announcement days
across all countries and announcements involved in this study. S1 refers to significant abnormal return or cu-
mulative abnormal return of either direction across all of the QE announcements, while S2 refers to positive
abnormal returns or cumulative abnormal returns across the QE announcements. ***, **, and * refer to signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
All shares Large cap Small cap
AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR
t S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0 * * * * *
1 * *
2 * * ** ** ** * ** * **
3 * * ** *
4 * * *
5 * * *
6 * *
7 * *
8 *
9
10
11 *
12
13 *
14
15 *
16
17
18
19 *
20 *
21 *
22 *
23 * **
24 * **
25 * **
26 ** **
27 ** **
28 ** **
29 * **
30 * **
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6. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the current popularity of the unconventional monetary policies, namely
quantitative easing, this study examines whether quantitative easing announcements lead
to a stock market reaction or not. A number of researchers have shown how changes in
monetary policy and economic news announcements have had a significant impact on
stock market returns, however, no comprehensive study about the effect of quantitative
easing announcements has been done yet. This paper aims to fill this gap by studying if
these announcements lead to a significant stock market reaction, whether the reaction is
positive and whether small cap stocks react differently or not. Additionally, market effi-
ciency is investigated.
This study employs a variety of event study tests to increase the robustness of the results.
The parametric tests used include the Traditional T test and the Standardized Residual
test. Parametric tests assume that abnormal returns are normally distributed. To overcome
this limitation, three different nonparametric tests, the Sign test, the Generalized Sign test,
and the Corrado Rank test, are utilized. Both parametric tests show a significant positive
stock market reaction surrounding the announcement days, and the reaction is pronounced
for small cap stocks. The results from the nonparametric tests confirm these results. The
results from the Sign test and the Generalized Sign test show how the all shares, large
cap, and small cap indices react significantly and positively to the announcements. The
results from the Corrado Rank test show a stronger and longer significant positive reac-
tion for the small cap indices. The market appears to be incorporating the information
content of the QE announcements efficiently when it comes to the index-wide all shares
indices and the large cap indices. However, the Traditional T test, the Standardized Re-
sidual test, and the Corrado Rank test results for the small cap indices cast doubt on mar-
ket efficiency. The CAARs keep drifting upwards and remain statistically significant
starting from the announcement date up to the end of the test period at 30 trading days
after the announcement.
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Further research can be conducted on this topic by including announcements where the
central bank announces that it is investigating the possibility of beginning or extending
the time, size, or composition of the quantitative easing programme. This would include
surprise announcements and deal with the problem that some of the announcements in
this study may have already been expected by the public, and thus been already incorpo-
rated into the prices before the actual announcement was given. Moreover, this study
examines the local stock market reaction to the announcements. The stock markets are
integrated globally to some extent, and therefore the global stock market reaction could
be examined instead of only focusing on the local stock markets. Furthermore, more event
study tests could be employed, such as the Generalized Rank Test (Kolari and Pynnönen,
2010). Additionally, research could be done on whether different industries react to these
announcements differently.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1. Excerpts from the Quantitative Easing announcements
Bank of Japan
March 19, 2001
3. In light of this, the Bank has come to a conclusion that the economic conditions
warrant monetary easing as drastic as is unlikely to be taken under ordinary cir-
cumstances. Accordingly, the Bank decided at its Monetary Policy Meeting of
today to take the following policy actions.
a) Change in the operating target for money market operations
The main operating target for money market operations be changed from
the current uncollateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding balance
of the current accounts at the Bank of Japan. Under the new procedures,
the Bank provides ample liquidity, and the uncollateralized overnight call
rate will be determined in the market at a certain level below the ceiling
set by the Lombard-type lending facility.
b) CPI guideline for the duration of the new procedures
The new procedures for money market operations continue to be in place
until the consumer price index (excluding perishables, on a nationwide
statistics) registers stably a zero percent or an increase year on year.
c) Increase in the current-account balance at the Bank of Japan and declines
in interest rates
For the time being, the balance outstanding at the Bank's current accounts
be increased to around 5 trillion yen, or 1 trillion yen increase from the
average outstanding of 4 trillion yen in February 2001 (see Attachment).
As a consequence, it is anticipated that the uncollateralized overnight call
rate will significantly decline from the current target level of 0.15 percent
and stay close to zero percent under normal circumstances.
d) Increase in outright purchase of long-term government bonds
The Bank will increase the amount of its outright purchase of long-term
government bonds from the current 400 billion yen per month, in case it
considers that increase to be necessary for providing liquidity smoothly.
The outright purchase is, on the other hand, subject to the limitation that
the outstanding amount of long-term government bonds effectively held
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by the Bank, i.e., after taking account of the government bond sales under
gensaki repurchase agreements, be kept below the outstanding balance of
banknotes issued.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
November 25, 2008
The Federal Reserve announced on Tuesday that it will initiate a program to purchase the
direct obligations of housing-related government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)--Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks--and mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae.  Spreads of rates on GSE
debt and on GSE-guaranteed mortgages have widened appreciably of late.  This action is
being taken to reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of
houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved conditions in
financial markets more generally.
Purchases of up to $100 billion in GSE direct obligations under the program will be con-
ducted with the Federal Reserve's primary dealers through a series of competitive auctions
and will begin next week.  Purchases of up to $500 billion in MBS will be conducted by
asset managers selected via a competitive process with a goal of beginning these pur-
chases before year-end.  Purchases of both direct obligations and MBS are expected to
take place over several quarters.  Further information regarding the operational details of
this program will be provided after consultation with market participants.
Bank of England
5 March 2009
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee today voted to reduce the official
Bank Rate paid on commercial bank reserves by 0.5 percentage points to 0.5%, and to
undertake a programme of asset purchases of £75 billion financed by the issuance of cen-
tral bank reserves.
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Bank of England
7 May 2009
The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee today voted to maintain the official
Bank Rate paid on commercial bank reserves at 0.5%. The Committee also voted to con-
tinue with its programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank re-
serves and to increase its size by £50 billion to a total of £125 billion.
Bank of England
6 August 2009
The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee today voted to maintain the official
Bank Rate paid on commercial bank reserves at 0.5%. The Committee also voted to con-
tinue with its programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank re-
serves and to increase its size by £50 billion to £175 billion.
Bank of England
5 November 2009
The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee today voted to maintain the official
Bank Rate paid on commercial bank reserves at 0.5%. The Committee also voted to con-
tinue with its programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank re-
serves and to increase its size by £25 billion to £200 billion.
Bank of Japan
October 5, 2010
The Bank will examine establishing, as a temporary measure, a program on its balance
sheet to purchase various financial assets, such as government securities, commercial pa-
per (CP), corporate bonds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and Japan real estate invest-
ment trusts (J-REITs) and to conduct the fixed-rate funds-supplying operation
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
November 3, 2010
To promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over
time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to expand its
holdings of securities. The Committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting
principal  payments  from  its  securities  holdings.  In  addition,  the  Committee  intends  to
purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second
quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month. The Committee will regularly
review the pace of its securities purchases and the overall size of the asset-purchase pro-
gram in light of incoming information and will adjust the program as needed to best foster
maximum employment and price stability.
Bank of Japan
August 4, 2011
At the Monetary Policy Meeting held today, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan de-
cided, by a unanimous vote to enhance monetary easing by increasing the total size of the
Asset Purchase Program by about 10 trillion yen2 from about 40 trillion yen to about 50
trillion yen.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
September 13, 2012
To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is
at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase
policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a
pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the
year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced
in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from
its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-
backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings
of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year,
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should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets,
and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.
Bank of Japan
September 19, 2012
The Bank decided to increase the total size of the Program by about 10 trillion yen, from
about 70 trillion yen to about 80 trillion yen. The increase in the size of the Program
corresponds with the size of additional purchases of treasury discount bills (T-Bills) by
about 5 trillion yen and Japanese government bonds (JGBs) by about 5 trillion yen.
The increased purchases under the Program will be completed by around end-2013. Spe-
cifically, additional purchases of T-Bills and JGBs will be completed by around end-June
2013 and around end-2013, respectively. Through these measures, the amount outstand-
ing of the Program will be about 65 trillion yen by around end-2012, about 75 trillion yen
by around end-June 2013, and about 80 trillion yen by around end-2013.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
December 12, 2012
To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is
at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee will continue purchasing
additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The
Committee also will purchase longer-term Treasury securities after its program to extend
the average maturity of its holdings of Treasury securities is completed at the end of the
year, initially at a pace of $45 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its exist-
ing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency
mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and, in January, will
resume rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. Taken together, these actions
should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage mar-
kets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.
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Bank of Japan
April 4, 2013
The introduction of the "quantitative and qualitative monetary easing".
The Bank will achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year
rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time
horizon of about two years. In order to do so, it will enter a new phase of monetary easing
both in terms of quantity and quality. It will double the monetary base and the amounts
outstanding of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) as well as exchange-traded funds
(ETFs) in two years, and more than double the average remaining maturity of JGB pur-
chases.
Bank of Japan
October 31, 2014
At the Monetary Policy Meeting held today, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan de-
cided upon the following measures.
(1) Accelerating the pace of increase in the monetary base by a 5-4 majority
vote
(2) Increasing asset purchases and extending the average remaining maturity
of Japanese government bond (JGB) purchases by a 5-4 majority vote
European Central Bank
22 January 2015
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) today announced an ex-
panded asset purchase programme. Aimed at fulfilling the ECB’s price stability mandate,
this  programme  will  see  the  ECB  add  the  purchase  of  sovereign  bonds  to  its  existing
private sector asset purchase programmes in order to address the risks of a too prolonged
period of low inflation.
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Sveriges Riksbank
28/10/2015
Overall, the Executive Board's assessment is that monetary policy needs to be more ex-
pansionary in order to underpin the positive development in the Swedish economy and
safeguard the robustness of the upturn in inflation. The Executive Board has therefore
decided to extend the government bond purchasing programme by an additional SEK 65
billion so that purchases will amount to SEK 200 billion in total by the end of June
2016. The repo rate is left unchanged at −0.35 per cent but an initial raise in the rate will
be deferred by approximately six months compared with the previous assessment.
European Central Bank
3 December 2015
Second, as regards non-standard monetary policy measures, we decided to extend the
asset purchase programme (APP). The monthly purchases of €60 billion under the APP
are now intended to run until the end of March 2017, or beyond, if necessary, and in any
case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation con-
sistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium
term.
Third, we decided to reinvest the principal payments on the securities purchased under
the APP as they mature, for as long as necessary. This will contribute both to favourable
liquidity conditions and to an appropriate monetary policy stance. The technical details
will be communicated in due time.
Fourth, we decided to include, in the public sector purchase programme, euro-denomi-
nated marketable debt instruments issued by regional and local governments lo-
cated in the euro area in the list of assets that are eligible for regular purchases by the
respective national central banks.
